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A. DILEMMA OF PERSISTENT INSURGENCIES 
Interstate warfare in Africa has been negligible since independence. Nevertheless, 
during this period, much of Africa has experienced significant violence due to internal 
conflict. Insurgencies often arise due to a marginalized portion of the population violently 
seeking redress, in some form, from the government. While no country in Africa enjoys 
the economic and political stability of the United States or Western Europe, some 
countries in Africa exhibit significant economic and political strength yet still fall victim 
to violent insurgencies, which can surprisingly endure for years. Why would an otherwise 
moderately stable and capable government allow an insurgency to persist within its 
borders? This thesis addresses this question and demonstrates the rationality in 
government acting or not acting to suppress an insurgency and extend protection for its 
people. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUBJECT 
The United States spent over $2 billion in 2015 on various security assistance 
programs in Africa with the goal of protecting U.S. interests.1 The U.S. government 
provides money, training, and equipment to supplement the efforts of African nations to 
improve security within their regions and borders. Beyond U.S. security assistance, a 
number of African countries are breaking through economic strata into middle-income 
status, and should seemingly possess the means and will to maintain control, extend 
governance within their borders, and protect their interests. Despite relative economic 
prosperity, the largest African economy, Nigeria, is experiencing the most civilian 
casualties in a warzone anywhere in the world.2 Security in Africa seems to be a complex 
issue to address. 
                                                 
1 “Africa at a Glance,” Center for International Policy, accessed September 1, 2015, 
www.securityassistance.org/africa. 
2 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide 2013 (Vienna: UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2013), 124.  
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From an insurgent’s perspective, Africa is ideally suited for insurgency and 
guerrilla warfare. Large under-governed spaces and porous borders provide sanctuary 
while neopatrimonialism engenders marginalized portions of the population who might 
support attempts to undermine the government. To counter these threats, an effective 
government will extend military and police control to enhance security and make strides 
to extend services and enfranchise marginalized populations. Stated U.S. strategy toward 
Africa supports these efforts through the four pillars of strengthening democratic 
institutions, spurring economic growth, advancing peace and security, and promoting 
opportunity and development.3 It stands to reason that a capable African country, with 
the help of U.S. foreign aid programs, should be able to effectively govern and counter an 
insurgency, thereby ensuring the peace and security of its citizens.  
This thesis explains why an otherwise capable government is unable or unwilling 
to effectively counter the violence inflicted by an insurgent movement by examining two 
enlightening case studies. Policy makers should seek to understand the circumstances 
surrounding an affected partner nation’s response when deciding where to provide new or 
continuing security assistance. They should also question whether that support will 
further U.S. interests and the stated U.S. strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Each 
situation is different and simply prescribing counterinsurgency doctrine may not be 
effective if a partner government does not also desire a quick end to an ongoing 
insurgency. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To better understand the persistence of insurgencies, this thesis compares the 
Nigeria/Boko Haram conflict with the somewhat similar struggle between Uganda and 
the Lord’s Resistance Army. The literature review surveys pertinent theories about 
insurgency, counterinsurgency, and government motivations that might enable an 
insurgency to persist. It also explores ways in which insurgencies persist in countering 
government pressure. The next section examines various potential government responses 
to insurgencies in order to place African responses in the proper context.  
                                                 
3 White House, The, Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 2012). 
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1. Insurgency Growth and Resourcing 
Insurgency is one term of many that describe the struggle of a non-state actor 
against the state. Others include guerrilla warfare, low intensity conflict, or small warfare. 
Some terms that make reference to the practitioner and their tactics include: insurgent, 
partisan, guerrilla, terrorist, bandit, etc. As Mao Tse-Tung explained, an insurgency 
grows out of a people’s oppression and their inability to countenance further 
marginalization.4 From the start, however, an insurgency faces an uphill battle: after 
studying African insurgencies, Christopher Day and William Reno concluded that rebels 
have succeeded less than 10% of the time.5  
The path from general discontent to open rebellion—rebellion that legitimately 
poses a threat to the state or part of the state—is one that provides many points along the 
way where a government could effectively intervene. Intervention requires that the state 
recognize the unrest for what it is, and not discount it as criminal or terrorist acts. The 
nascent movement enjoys an initial informational advantage over the state. 
As the insurgency begins to grow, it demonstrates an ability to inflict damage on 
the state. In “Things Come Together,” Gordon McCormick and Frank Giordano explain 
that violence plays a critical role in this initial growth and organization process; the 
insurgency invariably begins small and weak, and a visible violent act conveys insurgent 
strength and state weakness. This broadens the insurgency’s ability to recruit and grow.6 
The insurgency may not yet possess much capacity beyond what it has just accomplished, 
but it sends a message to both the government and potential recruits that a legitimate new 
threat now exists.  
To harness this potential, the insurgency must commit to some form of 
organization. Che Guevara, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, and Andrew Scott et al., 
describe the essential nature of leadership and the types of organizational structure that 
                                                 
4 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961), 7. 
5 Christopher R. Day and William S. Reno, “In Harm’s Way: African Counter-Insurgency and 
Patronage Politics,” Civil Wars 16, no. 2 (2014), 106. 
6 Gordon McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerrilla 
Mobilization,” Small Wars Journal 28, no. 2 (2007), 307–308. 
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can help turn discontent into outright rebellion and violence.7 While no single structure 
works for every situation, organization is essential. Guevara advocates a military type 
structure with organized platoons and officers.8 The organization must have political and 
military aims and the ability to recruit, collect and distribute resources, collect and 
disseminate intelligence and information (or propaganda), and ultimately be able to hold 
territory and exert control.9 Different structures have different strengths and weaknesses 
that a counterinsurgent force can exploit, nevertheless the literature is unanimous in 
agreeing that such a structure is essential for fostering and continuing an insurgency.10 
The initial steps taken in operating, recruiting, and organizing are significant for 
determining the insurgency’s ability to persist, and in most cases the state will have 
defeated a movement before it arrives at this point. 
Following the initial breakout, an insurgency must leverage its organization and 
environment to collect resources (people, food, weapons, sanctuary, etc.) in order to bring 
the fight to the state. The insurgency needs people, and the ability to recruit more people. 
T. David Mason, Leites and Wolf, and McCormick and Giordano emphasize that as an 
insurgency extends its control over an area, the people in that area are more likely to go 
along with it in order to survive. Exerting control and mild coercion grants the insurgency 
the ability to obtain resources from the population, and sustain its ability to recruit.11 The 
literature further emphasizes the insurgents’ need for a safe haven. Such an area may 
often come in the form of sanctuary in a neighboring country (especially in Africa).12 
This sanctuary provides the insurgency with the ability to train, plan, and escape state 
                                                 
7 Che Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961), 38; Nathan Leites and Charles 
Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Santa Monica: RAND, 1970), 
52; Andrew M. Scott et al., Insurgency (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 128. 
8 Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare, 38. 
9 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 48. 
10 Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), 80–81; 
Scott et al., Insurgency, 21; Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 71. 
11 T. David Mason, “Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant,” Public Choice 86, no. 
1 (1996), 69; Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 49; McCormick and Giordano, Things Come 
Together, 298–300. 
12 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 43; Seth G. Jones and Patrick B. Johnston, “The Future of Insurgency,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36 (2013), 11; Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism (Dulles, VA: 
Potomac Books, 2005), 146. 
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forces, thus greatly prolonging the conflict. Beyond people and place, the insurgency 
must also have the means to collect other resources; and in the modern context, this 
necessitates outside support.  
In a majority of cases, an insurgency will not be able to meet its needs (the 
resources necessary to attain its goals) by relying exclusively on internal support. Leites 
and Wolf and Scott et al. describe this dynamic in the form of inputs and outputs, and 
outline the structure of the insurgent organization around these categories.13 Paul Collier 
goes further and subjugates grievances, rhetoric, and ideology to economic concerns; 
without resources, the insurgency cannot persist.14 Quantitative studies by Collier, Ben 
Connable and Martin Libicki, and Leites and Wolf, and qualitative analysis by Max Boot 
and Bard O’Neill all point to the centrality of resource collection and the substantial 
increase in the likelihood of insurgent success when there is outside support.15 Seth Jones 
and Patrick Johnston also note that insurgencies with outside support endure on average 
three years longer, and increase their chance of success by 25%.16 The converse is also 
highlighted; when the sponsored insurgency becomes dependent on outside support, 
withdrawal of support often leads to the collapse of the insurgency.17 An insurgency that 
has succeeded in organizing, recruiting, and resourcing in the face of state power proves 
its ability to gain a foothold against the state to advance its goals, and persist. 
If it should reach this point, an uprising has progressed through two stages: 
preinsurgency and incipient conflict. It has other phases through which to progress: open 
                                                 
13 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 35; Scott et al., Insurgency, 51. 
14 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” in Leashing 
the Dogs of War, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Hampson Osler and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 199. 
15 Ibid.; Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 25–62; Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and 
Authority, 78; Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the 
Present (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), Location 378; O’Neill, Insurgency & 
Terrorism, 139. 
16 Jones and Johnston, “The Future of Insurgency,” 8. 
17 Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 72. 
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insurgency and resolution.18 These phases, and specifically the open insurgency phase, 
may last for extended periods of time, with an average insurgency historically persisting 
for over a decade. Insurgencies may seem to be defeated and disappear only to reappear 
years later. This is what tends to complicate the end of conflict or the seeming resolution 
of an insurgency. Connable and Libicki point to three possible outcomes: a government 
victory (in which case an insurgency can reappear depending on conditions), an insurgent 
victory (generally more stable), or a negotiated settlement (also historically indicative of 
future conflict).19 In Africa, Day and Reno find that negotiated settlement have occurred 
roughly 40% of the time, a higher proportion than the global average.20 The resourcing of 
an insurgency is significant in determining its persistence; however, by definition, the 
insurgents are not acting in a vacuum. Even more significant, as O’Neill argues, is the 
response of the government to the organized rebellion.21 
2. Government Reaction to Insurgency 
Governments typically respond in one of two ways to an insurgency: they will 
either seek to combat and defeat it, or they will choose to ignore it. First, a government 
can choose to counter or combat the insurgency. This approach has traditionally been 
referred to as counterinsurgency, or COIN. Most of the literature dealing with COIN 
overlaps with that on insurgencies. In contrast to conventional warfare, the state’s 
approach to counterinsurgency must strike some balance between the employment of 
political and military power—strongly favoring the political. Ideally the state will 
acknowledge that the insurgency has arisen in response to some grievance.22 The 
literature is unanimous that no single strategy, tactic, force ratio, or posture is effective in 
every situation. O’Neill points out that as insurgencies diverge in their grievances, goals, 
                                                 
18 Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (Langley: United States Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2012), 5–22; Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison, 
“Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007), 
323. 
19 Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 14–20. 
20 Day and Reno, “In Harm’s Way,” 106. 
21 O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 155. 
22 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 71; Scott et al., Insurgency, 113, 127; Department of the 
Army, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Handbook (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2007), 1–22. 
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strength, support, etc., so must the governments adapt their approaches to meet the 
threat.23 Scholars and COIN practitioners have grouped counterinsurgency strategy and 
government courses of action into three broad categories: the enemy or rebel-centric 
approach, the population-centric approach, and the authoritarian approach.24  
The enemy-centric approach, also referred to as search-and-destroy or “killing 
guerrillas,” has proven to be the least effective method, but is generally the most 
practiced in Africa.25 It attempts to view the insurgents as a conventional force and 
utilizes conventional military tactics to hunt down and combat them with little regard for 
the security of the surrounding population, giving little attention to their socio-economic 
well-being and little interest in holding and controlling territory. O’Neill argues that this 
conventional military approach, by neglecting political and economic considerations, 
generally works counter to the government.26 As Collier explains, this approach helps 
make the prospect of guerrilla warfare so attractive to insurgents—governments are 
generally very bad at COIN.27  
Day and Reno argue that African governments are most likely to execute an 
enemy-centric campaign. The authors note that most insurgencies in Africa are led by 
individuals who may have previously been close to the regime and are struggling for 
power within an existing patronage network. For both the insurgents and the government, 
the population matters little in this struggle for power. The government’s focus is on 
eliminating the insurgents and cutting off their material resources.28 So long as the 
government neglects the population, and the valuable intelligence they could provide, the 
                                                 
23 O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 156. 
24 Michael J. Engelhardt, “Democracies, Dictatorships and Counterinsurgency: Does Regime Type 
really Matter?” Conflict Quarterly 12, no. 3 (Summer, 1992), 57; Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the 
Analysis of Insurgency, 16; Boot, Invisible Armies, 180; Day and Reno, “In Harm’s Way,” 110; Yuri 
Zhukov, “Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-Insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no. 3 (2007), 441. 
25 Day and Reno, “In Harm’s Way,” 111. 
26 O’Neill E., Insurgency & Terrorism, 158. 
27 Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict,” 198. 
28 Day and Reno, “In Harm’s Way,” 112. 
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insurgents stand a significant chance of persisting for a longer period of time. In this 
scenario, the population loses. 
The population-centric approach is widely viewed as the most effective method of 
prosecuting counter-insurgency. It is commonly, if somewhat misleadingly, referred to as 
the “hearts and minds” approach. A more descriptive term might be clear-and-hold, with 
an emphasis on policing actions.29 This strategy was pioneered by French COIN 
practitioners Gallieni and Lyautey in Asia and Africa. Population-centric COIN has 
gained wide acceptance, with minor variations, as the most effective method of 
prosecuting COIN.30 Drawing from the literature, the most essential elements of this 
strategy are security, control, and governance. The government strives to eliminate the 
insurgent threat from a village by relying on local intelligence and then holds that 
territory and exerts its influence over the area. By so doing, even members of the 
population with insurgent sympathies will stay in line and be unable to support the 
insurgency.31  
Day and Reno emphasize that population-centric COIN has rarely been practiced 
by African regimes. All too often African regimes rule through patron-client networks 
instead of strong institutions. They therefore tend to practice enemy-centric approaches.32 
Despite population-centric COIN being recognized as the best approach, it has also 
yielded long and persistent counterinsurgency struggles. 
The literature pays somewhat less attention to the authoritarian approach. In 
applying this strategy the government is not concerned for the population and often 
employs scorched-earth tactics. Engelhardt argues that the authoritarian approach is used 
                                                 
29 Paul Dixon, “Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (2009), 360. 
30 Etienne de Durand, “France,” in Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and 
Challenges, eds. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (New York: Routledge, 2010), 13. 
31 Jeffrey Treistman, “Home Away from Home: Dynamics of Counterinsurgency Warfare,” 
Comparative Strategy 31, no. 3 (2012), 236; Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 119; McCormick, Horton and Harrison, “Things Fall Apart,” 
322; Peter Mansoor, “Army,” in Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges, 
eds. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (New York: Routledge, 2010), 75; Scott et al., Insurgency, 126; Day 
and Reno, “In Harm’s Way,” 107. 
32 Day and Reno, “In Harm’s Way,” 107. 
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by dictatorships and repressive regimes, blurring the line with the enemy-centric 
approach.33 Zhukov outlines the specific advantages an authoritarian regime enjoys when 
prosecuting COIN: Population control measures, aggressive intelligence collection, and a 
lack of popular pressure to restrain force.34 Ultimately the control regime or police state 
eradicates incipient insurgencies at an early stage. However, recent history, however, 
demonstrates that when authoritarian regimes fail, they fail catastrophically and latent or 
even new insurgent movements will then quickly rise to challenge the failing regime—
Libya, Syria, Iraq are prime examples. The authoritarian COIN approach does not figure 
in the case studies examined in this thesis. 
Because these overarching COIN strategies are very general in nature, the 
literature is clear that every situation requires its own mix of different strategies and 
tactics if the government hopes to successfully counter the insurgent threat. For instance 
David Kilcullen, Scott et al., and O’Neill emphasize the importance of different 
approaches and adaptability for every insurgency.35  
3. Government Inaction 
What much of the COIN literature does not consider is that a government may 
choose to not respond sufficiently to an incipient, growing, or ongoing insurgency. Not 
responding sufficiently might be logical in some situations. This response seems less 
obvious to a Western student of conflict: if a movement seeks to wrest control from the 
government, the government must do something to counter it. But countering in a 
developing world context is easier. Two reasons can help explain anemic responses in the 
developing world; the government does not have sufficient resources to counter the 
insurgency (unable to counter) or the government consciously chooses to underperform 
for political or economic reasons (does not want to counter).  
                                                 
33 Engelhardt, “Democracies, Dictatorships and Counterinsurgency,” 55–57. 
34 Zhukov, “Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-Insurgency,” 441. 
35 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 183; Scott et al., Insurgency, 113; O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 
156. 
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Logically, if a state does not have the resources to counter the insurgency, over 
time the insurgency will grow to the point that it will supplant the government. Most 
African states could fall into this category of being unable to muster the resources to 
counter a sizeable insurgency. Jean-Paul Azam argues that African governments must 
provide healthcare and primary education for all in order to prevent legitimate rebellion. 
Few African governments have demonstrated a capacity to meet this threshold.36  
When it comes to the resources necessary to actually combat the insurgency, the 
government must be able to commit to a decade-long struggle and maintain a constant 
stream of trained and equipped security forces. For instance, Connable and Libicki put 
the required ratio of security force personnel to population at about 20:1000 in areas 
cleared of insurgents in order to maintain order and prevent recapture by insurgents.37 
This is a very sizeable force to keep employed and deployed for a decade. It is entirely 
plausible that an African government would not have the resources to maintain this level 
of commitment to decisively defeat an insurgency. This does not mean that government is 
completely helpless, or totally resource poor. Perhaps the insurgency has outstripped its 
abilities thanks to outside support. The government also might employ an ineffective 
COIN strategy or might not be able to muster the resources sufficient to defeat the 
insurgency. 
While a great deal of literature focuses on the resources necessary to support an 
insurgency or the state, intentional government inaction by a capable state has received 
little attention. The relative lack of literature addressing government inaction is likely due 
to the fact that, in practice, no government has fallen directly into this category of 
inaction and succeeded in maintaining power. Instead of drawing a binary distinction 
between government action and government inaction, these distinctions likely represent 
either end of a spectrum, along which different levels of government response fall. Even 
the weakest and poorest of governments is institutionally and economically stronger than 
a nascent insurgency. Naturally, as Scott et al. point out, the government’s primary 
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objective is to maintain adequate strength to stay in power.38 It will therefore expend the 
resources necessary to remain in power—perhaps securing the capital while giving up 
more sparsely populated rural areas to the insurgency. Essentially it might opt to expend 
the minimum effort necessary to prevent its takeover and instead accept a de facto 
stalemate.  
4. Conflict Persistence for Political Reasons 
Government inaction in the context of this thesis refers to a capable state that 
chooses to permit an insurgency to persist for political or economic reasons. The 
government may do the minimum necessary to prevent the insurgents’ outright victory. 
Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz argue that in the patron/client system that is 
germane to Africa, the patron will permit violence to maintain necessary relationships 
with clients in order to maintain power.39 Clients affected by conflict will be forced to 
continue to rely on the patron for some form of protection. This form of violence might 
permit an insurgency to grow and even govern in a politically marginal part of the 
country, to force continued reliance on the center. This condition allows the regime to 
channel resources to well-connected clients while allowing continued conflict among less 
politically relevant groups. 
In this manner, regional instability would serve the needs of the center. In a region 
disloyal to the ruler, instability would not only force reliance on the center but also 
prevent organized dissent. People concerned for their survival would have less time and 
energy to pose a political risk. David Keen argues for the usefulness of internal conflict to 
enfeeble political opposition, absorb the efforts of discontented citizens, and intimidate 
those who might pose a political challenge.40 An insurgency would maintain instability in 
a region to the political advantage of the center. A ruler seeking to maintain power would 
benefit politically from a persistent insurgency destabilizing an oppositional region. Such 
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a regime would only take measures to prevent the insurgency from spilling over to other 
regions or from threatening the center. 
Azam continues this logic, overlaying an ethnic dimension to the redistribution of 
resources. As long as an insurgent ethnic group does not threaten the center of the state, 
the state can continue to divert resources away from certain groups without threat of 
overthrow.41 Clionadh Raleigh refers to these ethnic groups as “politically irrelevant,” in 
that the government does not derive its power base from these groups and can therefore 
afford to marginalize them.42 The literature explains the ability and some rationale for a 
state to intentionally neglect an ongoing insurgency; however, it fails to directly explain 
why a capable and resourced government would permit this violence to perpetuate for 
years, ultimately challenging its sovereignty.  
5. Conflict Persistence for Economic Reasons 
Ongoing insurgent conflict might also economically benefit governmental elites, 
incentivizing the continued conflict. Much has been written about war-economies. For 
instance, Philippa Atkinson discusses this phenomenon in respect to Liberia, where the 
conflict allowed factions within the government to directly profit from the country’s 
natural resources.43 The conflict then enables members of the elite to justify not having to 
share resource wealth with the population. The international market often prevents 
significant foreign intervention in these conflicts. Reno explains a situation whereby 
elites profit from a “free-lance accumulation of wealth.”44 As Keen explains, the conflict 
allows the government to use violence to maintain a monopoly on access to resources.45 
Keen outlines seven significant categories of illicit economic activity that appear during 
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civil conflicts: pillage, protection money, controlling or monopolizing trade, labor 
exploitation, land seizure, stealing aid supplies, and enhanced benefits for the military.46 
If an insurgency proves to be profitable for elites, they have less incentive to put an end 
to it. Not only will they not want to jeopardize current profits, but they also will not want 
potential post-conflict investigations into their illicit activities.  
Certainly not all conflict-associated economic benefits are illicit. Foreign and 
humanitarian aid programs are often directed toward conflict areas, providing services 
that the government is unwilling or unable to provide on its own. While helpful to the 
people who receive it, the aid can also be siphoned off.47 As Andrew Mwenda explains, 
conflict often serves as a legitimate justification for substantial increases to the military 
budget. This increase cements the loyalty of the military leadership while also providing 
an avenue for corruption.48  
Given the political and economic benefits to be gleaned from the conflict, we are 
left with four questions why insurgencies may be prolonged. Does an insurgency persist 
because it is well resourced? Because the government is under resourced? Or because the 
actors involved derive some political or economic benefit therefrom? 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to further understand government responses to insurgency in Africa, this 
thesis focuses on two case studies with the goal of demonstrating instances when a sitting 
government may have demonstrably allowed an insurgency to persist, despite a legitimate 
ability to counter it. The research question grew out of a desire to understand why 
Nigeria, with the largest economy in Africa, has been seemingly ineffective in defeating 
Boko Haram. In comparison, over the last two decades Uganda has similarly enjoyed 
sustained economic growth, freedom of speech, multi-party politics, a robust civil 
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society, and a generally capable Ugandan military with extensive outside support. 
However, the LRA persisted in Uganda from the late 1980s until 2007. Why? 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis is organized around the two case studies previously mentioned. 
Chapter II examines the background and issues at play in Uganda’s struggle against the 
LRA, focusing on the resourcing of the insurgency and the government, followed by an 
examination of who might have benefitted politically or economically. Chapter III 
similarly examines Nigeria and Boko Haram. Chapter IV then more closely compares 




II. UGANDA AND THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY 
In 1991, Uganda launched a violently oppressive military campaign, Operation 
North, against Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. 
While purporting to represent the oppressed and marginalized people of the north, over 
time the LRA came to be increasingly viewed as a scourge. Despite the shift in local 
sentiment, the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) was brutal in its prosecution of 
this operation, resorting to torture and indiscriminate killing to root out what at that time 
was a four-year-old insurgency. According to numerous assessments, the operation was 
very nearly successful in routing the insurgency before an unexplained change in tactics 
drastically softened the army’s approach and halted its progress in destroying the 
insurgency.49 The LRA escaped intact and, although significantly diminished and no 
longer a threat to Uganda, remains at large.  
What explains the long persistence of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda? Is 
it best explained by a well-resourced insurgency, an under-resourced state, or a 
combination of political and economic reasons of benefit to the Ugandan government? 
The conflict between the LRA and the government of Uganda presents an interesting case 
study for numerous reasons: the LRA’s 20-year-long reign of terror in the northern part 
of the country; Uganda’s post-conflict reconstruction and relative economic growth 
during this same timeframe; and Uganda’s political dynamics. This chapter begins by 
outlining a brief history of the conflict between the LRA and the government of Uganda. 
Next, it examines the strong insurgency hypothesis as an explanation for the LRA’s 
persistence. The chapter then examines the under-resourced state hypothesis and whether 
Uganda was unable to counter the threat. Finally, the chapter examines what might have 
been the political and economic motivations on the part of the Ugandan government to 
allow the LRA to persist. This case is significant in that it ultimately ends in the 
government’s favor (while Kony and the LRA continue to exist, they no longer pose a 
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threat to the government of Uganda); nevertheless, why did a small, regional insurgency 
become significant and persist for 20 years? 
A. HISTORY OF UGANDA/LRA CONFLICT 
1. Colonial Rule to Independence 
From colonial times, the principal people of what became northern Uganda, the 
Acholi, were treated differently. Economic development in the colony of Uganda focused 
on the resource rich Luwero triangle (between Lake Victoria, Lake Albert, and Lake 
Kuyoga) in middle of the country. The British introduced cash crops into this fertile 
region, drawing labor from less productive regions, such as the north.50 This colonial 
investment in specific regions left the north of the colony relatively underdeveloped; 
military service was encouraged among northern ethnic groups such as the Acholi who 
had few other options for employment.51 Because of this early distinction, the Acholi 
became the principal ethnicity within the colony’s military forces. This situation 
continued beyond the colonial period with the Acholi casting itself as the military or 
warrior ethnicity.52 This, in essence, created a military class or ethnicity within the 
colony and subsequent independent state of Uganda.53 
Independence came to Uganda in 1962. At independence, the prime minister and 
eventual president, Milton Obote, extended governmental and ministerial positions to key 
Acholi people within the party structure.54 At the same time, the independent Ugandan 
military grew from a colonial security apparatus to a professional military. The Acholi, 
previously overrepresented in the military, remained overrepresented in all ranks. Under 
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Obote, an estimated one third of the Ugandan military came from the north, with similar 
rates within the civil service.55  
2. 1970s–1980s 
When the Obote regime was overthrown by Idi Amin in 1972, the new president 
leveraged ethnic differences to help consolidate power. Amin identified the Acholi and 
other northern ethnic groups as complicit with the Obote regime in its oppression of 
others.56 Blaming them for a poor economy and corruption of the Obote regime, Amin 
eliminated the Acholi from positions of authority within the government and military.57 
To escape persecution, most Acholi elite fled to southern Sudan while those who 
remained in northern Uganda endured the terror of Amin’s regime.58 While certainly not 
the sole target of Amin’s violence, many Acholi were individually purged, killed, and the 
ethnic group as a whole was marginalized and lost all political influence. Obote, at the 
head of the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) and with Tanzanian assistance, 
overthrew Amin in 1979 and was returned to power. Obote, himself a northerner but not 
Acholi, received significant support from the Acholi. This change in power returned the 
Acholi to the center of the military and political influence by the early 1980s.59  
Soon after Obote resumed the presidency, another insurgency developed: the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) of Yoweri Museveni. Museveni proved 
successful in uniting many southern ethnic groups to counter what they perceived to be a 
repressive and northern-dominated Obote government.60 From 1981, the NRM made 
progress against government forces, especially in the economically critical Luwero 
triangle. In 1983 Obote launched Operation Bonanza, a brutal and murderous campaign 
that killed an estimated 300,000 civilians in central Uganda—most Ugandans held the 
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Acholi responsible for this atrocity.61 As the NRM continued its march to the capital, the 
military leadership lost confidence in Obote. The peak of Acholi power in Uganda 
occurred in 1985 when General Lutwa, an Acholi, overthrew Obote.62 Lutwa’s regime 
was also short lived as the NRM continued its military gains against the UNLA. Peace 
talks failed to halt the conflict, and ultimately the NRM took the capital and brought 
Museveni to power in 1986.  
3. NRM Rule and UPDM Uprising 
Museveni created a new type of no-party democracy to rebuild a war-torn 
Uganda. The National Resistance Army (NRA) continued to fight the remaining elements 
of the UNLA as they fled north. The insurgent army of the NRM had become the national 
army of Uganda and Museveni filled the government with southerners. The perception 
among the Acholi was that a new southern dominated government would govern at their 
expense and would punish them for their prominence in the UNLA and the atrocities they 
are alleged to have committed during Operation Bonanza. The NRA chased the UNLA 
north into southern Sudan and proceeded to occupy the north as if it were a foreign, 
hostile territory.63 The Acholi became a divided, conquered, and oppressed people in an 
economically depressed region far removed from the center of power in Uganda. 
As the NRA consolidated control of the north, the elements of the UNLA that had 
escaped to Sudan were reorganizing. In early 1986, an amalgamation of supporters, 
politicians, and military leaders from the Obote and Amin regimes, many of whom were 
Acholi, rapidly formed a well organized resistance; the Ugandan People’s Defense 
Movement (UPDM). The UPDM based in London, while its active military arm, the 
Ugandan People’s Defense Army (UPDA), operated out of Sudan. Many Acholi 
sympathized with the UPDA and actively supported it. Most Acholi viewed the NRA as a 
hostile occupying force determined to eradicate the Acholi.64 The UPDA enjoyed early 
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successes in both conventional battles and guerrilla raids against the NRA. Attacking 
from southern Sudan into northern Uganda, the UPDA had substantial local support.65 
Nevertheless, by the middle of 1986, these early gains dissipated and, during the next six 
months, the UPDM lost support and fractured politically. The UPDA deteriorated as the 
insurgency ran short of ammunition and resources in the face of a stronger NRA.66 
Despite the demise of the UPDM/A, by late 1986 the Acholi were far from pacified and 
continued to feel oppressed at the hands of the Museveni government. 
4. The Holy Spirit Movement 
As the UPDM was falling apart, a woman named Alice Lakwena organized what 
came to be known as the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). Claiming divine provenance, 
Lakwena appealed to the cultural and religious foundations of the Acholi community. 
The HSM fused elements of Christianity with traditional beliefs, advocating a divine 
mandate for the Acholi to reassert its strength against an evil and corrupt government.67 
Lakwena managed to rally former UNLA soldiers, elements of the UPDM, support from 
Acholi elders, and subsequently the support of other ethnic groups who felt equally 
oppressed by Museveni’s government. At the HSM’s peak in mid-1987, Lakwena led 
between 7,000–10,000 troops.68  
Her insurgent army enjoyed rapid success, and by the end of 1987 had moved to 
within 12 miles of the capital, Kampala. The further her force got from Acholiland, 
however, the less support it enjoyed, while it also began to outrun its resources. The NRA 
succeeded in pushing back and dispersing the northern-based insurgency, eliminating it 
as a threat by the end of 1987. Once again the Acholi people viewed themselves as 
defeated, and economically and socially repressed, with little recourse for regaining a 
voice in a southern-dominated Uganda. 
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The movement defeated, Lakwena escaped the country. Northerners’ grievances 
continued to mount, and soon Joseph Kony took up where the Holy Spirit Movement left 
off. Kony had served in the UNLA as a battalion commander and participated in the 
HSM. He initially derived authority by claiming to be a cousin and spiritual successor to 
Lakwena.69 Despite this provenance, he was not unanimously accepted by the Acholi 
leadership; he was not considered representative of the people.70 Kony found enough 
support that he was able to organize the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). He set out 
initially to overthrow Museveni’s government and install a representative government 
based on the Ten Commandments. He left details beyond this extremely vague.71  
5. The Government Response 
Curiously, the NRA, that had so soundly defeated the UPDA and HSM, quickly 
found itself ill-prepared for the guerrilla conflict emerging with the LRA. Both the 
government and military seemed equally unmotivated to combat it. The Ugandan 
government and NRA initially perceived the LRA to be more of a criminal movement 
than an insurgency. Quinn contends that the standard government response to insurgent 
groups during this period (of which there were at least 27 after Museveni came to power) 
was to ignore them; and, if forced to confront them, to do so in a brutal military manner. 
Unsurprisingly, this approach was generally unsuccessful, especially against the LRA.72  
The brutal tactics employed by the NRA in COIN operations demonstrated an 
institutionalized lack of professionalism within the officer corps. It was evident, too, that 
these, atrocities were tacitly tolerated by the political authorities since nothing was done 
to discipline the guilty. Schomerus cites this lack of professionalism as the reason for the 
prolongation of the war.73 Branch goes further, stating that troops deployed to northern 
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Uganda lacked sufficient equipment and morale; when coupled with corruption, this 
created a military with a curtailed capacity or will to fight.74 The lack of discipline 
clearly affected the ability of the military to deal with the growing insurgency. 
Ugandan divisions sent to combat the insurgency, which on paper consisted of 
7,200 troops, were lucky to have 1,500 combat capable soldiers engaging the enemy.75 
The Ugandan troops did not demonstrate a significant desire to fight. Nor did the officers 
decisively lead their troops toward defeating the LRA. Regular reports indicated UPDF 
troops arrived in areas well after the LRA had attacked and left. Despite constantly 
increasing military budgets, the UPDF troops remained in poor condition. The 
government consistently failed to improve the situation or properly train and equip its 
soldiers.76  
The UPDF also organized Acholi militias from people contained in internally 
displaced persons (IDP) camps. These militias received minimal weaponry and training, 
yet were sent to battle the LRA while the UPDF remained in barracks.77 The military 
used the militias as another method of avoiding combat with the LRA. During this period, 
Museveni consistently failed to address the lack of professionalism and fighting spirit of 
his military and failed to hold his senior generals accountable for their failure to end the 
conflict.  
6. The Lord’s Resistance Army 
Over time, the LRA’s political motivations became more obscure, and by the mid-
1990s, the organization seemed to espouse no agenda beyond violence and terror.78 Many 
senior leaders of the UPDA had joined Kony and were assigned leadership positions 
within the organization. These experienced leaders advocated guerrilla tactics and terror 
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rather than the conventional tactics used by the UPDA and HSM.79 This lent the LRA a 
decidedly different footprint than other insurgencies. The focus on guerrilla tactics 
dispersed the active fighters widely among the population. By the early-1990s, the Acholi 
increasingly turned against the LRA, viewing it as an unrepresentative group of thugs. 
Likewise, in response to the Acholi militias, the LRA turned against the Acholi.80 This 
marked a significant change in the progression of the conflict as the Acholi found 
themselves victims of both the government forces as well as the LRA. 
During its 20 years of activity in northern Uganda, the LRA’s size has fluctuated; 
at its peak the group was estimated to have around 5,000 active fighters. By 1991, after 
the LRA lost local Acholi support, it continued to fill its ranks through coercive means 
and by abducting children to fight on its behalf. Estimates vary, but one survey found that 
by 2001 nearly 10,000 children had been abducted and pressed into service by the 
LRA.81 Throughout much of this period, thousands of children flocked into protected 
areas of the city of Gulu every night to prevent being kidnapped—they became known to 
as the “night children.” This aspect of the LRA conflict attracted a high degree of 
international attention. Numerous NGOs exerted efforts to protect the children from 
abduction and attempted to reintegrate the child soldiers back into society.82 At times, the 
LRA forces dwindled to no more than a few hundred active fighters, but always managed 
to regenerate even in relatively underpopulated northern Uganda; coercion and 
kidnapping proved highly effective.83  
By the mid-1990s, the conflict had assumed a regional dynamic. From roughly 
1993, Sudan provided weapons, supplies, and a safe haven to the LRA in southern Sudan. 
The LRA headquarters was located in Juba, Sudan until the early 2000s.84 This assistance 
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helped turn Kony’s force from a bush army equipped with rudimentary weapons into one 
capable of employing automatic weapons and explosives.85 This support likely continued 
until roughly 2001, when the Khartoum government and Ugandan government agreed to 
no longer support each other’s insurgencies.86 While Sudan’s support likely proved 
critical through the 1990s, Kony’s force proved strong enough to carry on without it. 
Ultimately, the group was strongest, most lethal, and most operationally effective when it 
was actively supported by Sudan. 
7. Attempts to Resolve Conflict 
Over the course of the insurgency, the central government’s posture and 
commitment to fight has seemed to wax and wane. The NRA, renamed the Ugandan 
People’s Defense Force (UPDF) in 1995, maintained a deployed presence in northern 
Uganda throughout the conflict. The force was generally composed of small numbers of 
ill-equipped and under-resourced troops who eschewed combat as much as possible. 
Military leaders organized occasional military operations to push out the insurgency. 
These operations were highly violent and placed little emphasis on protecting civilian 
lives.87 Unsuccessful peace talks took place from 1993 to 1994 and again from 2006 to 
2008 between these military operations. By 2006, the government finally succeeded in 
driving the LRA out of Uganda.88 The LRA continued to function and wreak havoc in 
neighboring countries while the Ugandan government, in cooperation with its neighbors, 
maintained a minimum of military pressure. These varying approaches, which were 
sufficient to conclude the conflict, served to outwardly demonstrate resolve without 
substantial cost to the Museveni regime. 
Museveni did not maintain constant pressure on the insurgency, and was known 
to release pressure when the LRA was nearly defeated.89 The units he sent to combat the 
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insurgency were mere shells of true combat divisions; the best trained and equipped units 
remained in the capital, far from combat. Also, Museveni did not deploy the elite 
Presidential Guard to the region until 2003.90 When finally deployed, this highly-trained 
and well-equipped unit likely contributed to the UPDF’s ultimate success in routing the 
LRA from the country. Otherwise, the preceding lack of military resolve suggests that 
Museveni was, at the very least, apathetic to the existence of the insurgency in northern 
Uganda. 
While the military effort to end the insurgency was ongoing, the government and 
the LRA entered into peace negotiations to put an end to hostilities on at least two 
occasions. The first round of peace talks took place in 1994. A fractious LRA proved 
difficult for the government to deal with, and Kony requested a six-month long period in 
which to allegedly rally his forces around a peace agreement. Museveni reacted harshly 
to Kony’s request, demanding LRA disarmament in a single week. In so doing, Museveni 
dismantled the peace process. Museveni claimed (perhaps accurately) that Kony was 
using the ceasefire and peace talks to stall until he received Sudanese assistance.91 
What is telling is that Museveni had negotiated with other insurgent groups—to 
include the UPDA, during the 1998 Gulu peace accords. These talks granted amnesty to 
UPDA combatants, and even integrated some combatants into the NRA/UPDF. Despite 
conciliatory successes like these, Museveni consistently took a hardline approach with 
the LRA.92 Nearly a decade later, the government and the LRA agreed to a new round of 
peace talks in 2006. The talks, which began with a short-lived August 2006 ceasefire, 
continued for over two years. During the negotiations, the LRA accused the UPDF of 
violating the ceasefire and surrounding the remnants of the LRA in Uganda. Also, while 
the talks were ongoing, Uganda launched Operation Lighting Thunder in December 
2008.93 This multinational pursuit of the LRA outside Uganda’s borders effectively 
ended the prolonged and ultimately unsuccessful Juba peace talks. The LRA was 
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complicit in the repeated failure of peace talks; however, the Museveni administration 
likewise contributed.  
8. The LRA as Mechanism of Power 
In the early 2000s, the government went to great lengths to separate the people 
from the LRA by moving the Acholi and other northern groups into internal displacement 
camps. While initially created as refuges for northerners who lost homes to the conflict, 
the camps came to house over 1.8 million people by 2005, or 95% of the total Acholi 
population.94 The conditions in these camps were abysmal with minimal services 
provided; and those services that were available were generally provided by NGOs, 
further distancing the Acholi from the central government.95 At worst, approximately 
1,000 people per day died in the IDP camps or, as Mwenda points out (echoed by 
Otunnu), far more IDPs died than the LRA could have killed.96 While certainly an 
indictment on Museveni’s treatment of the Acholi, the IDP camps succeeded in 
separating the northern people from the insurgents. This separation of the people from the 
insurgency likely contributed to the elimination of the LRA from Uganda in 2006. 
Although the IDP camps may have helped bring an end to the conflict, the abysmal 
conditions and governmental neglect are a further indictment on Museveni’s approach to 
countering the LRA. 
Museveni extended general amnesties at key points during the LRA conflict, 
drawing lessons from successful tactics used to counter the UPDA and HSM. These 
amnesties lured many fighters away from the LRA and facilitated their reintegration to 
society, child soldiers especially.97 The amnesty was especially effective in the early 
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2000s, with thousands abandoning the LRA and rejoining society—significantly 
weakening the insurgency.98  
Tripp explained these mixed messages by Museveni of inconsistent amnesty, 
peace talks, ceasefires, and violent military operations as being a clever strategy to 
maintain control of and popularity with the military.99 So long as the LRA continued to 
exist, Museveni had an enemy for the military to fight and a foe for the troops to rally 
against. This incentivized keeping the LRA around, whether that required pressing 
militias into the fight or stalling with peace talks that were doomed to fail. All proved to 
be effective tools in allowing the LRA to persist for nearly 30 years, while Museveni 
remains in power 
Although the UPDF never defeated the LRA, the LRA moved into the vast under-
governed territories of northeast Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from Sudan 
as well as into southeast Central African Republic. With U.S. military support, Uganda 
partnered with these countries to continue the search for Kony and the remaining LRA 
leaders. However, much of the terrain is difficult, and covers an area roughly the size of 
California.100 While the fight against the LRA was never Uganda’s top priority, it has 
fallen further down the list.101 Whether this is the end of the LRA is difficult to tell. The 
LRA was a significant scourge on Uganda for nearly 20 years—a scourge that should 
have been dispatched much the same as the short-lived UPDA and HSM insurgencies 
before it. This chapter further explores why this insurgency managed to persist and why 
the government may have implicitly allowed its continued survival. 
B. STRONG INSURGENCY HYPOTHESIS 
As outlined in Chapter I, an insurgency possesses certain advantages and 
disadvantages vis-a-vis the government. Generally the insurgency is at a resource 
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disadvantage when confronting a national military and the economic ability of the state to 
support and equip that military. The insurgency is left to rely on the resources of its 
members, support from the population (either voluntary or coerced), and outside support. 
Despite this resource disadvantage, an insurgency facing a weak government might be 
relatively strong. Lacking the resources to pursue it, an insurgency might manage to take 
root and grow for an extended period of time. If this growth and relative strength 
continues unchecked, then the insurgency is in a position to overthrow the government.  
Short of outright victory, an insurgency that endures for years might be assessed 
to be relatively strong, explaining its persistence. The Lord’s Resistance Army has lasted 
for 20 years. It has continually managed to find the resources necessary to survive. This 
section explores the hypothesis that the LRA may have persisted because of its relative 
strength versus the Ugandan government. Despite the LRA’s extended persistence, this 
section concludes that this hypothesis does not adequately explain the LRA’s 20 year 
terrorizing of the Ugandan people. This section begins by examining the LRA’s sources 
of manpower, financing, arming, and training. Next it continues with an examination of 
the LRA’s territory and safe havens, and concludes with an assessment of the group’s 
overall strength in contrast to that of the Ugandan government. 
1. Manpower 
As previously described, the LRA grew out of other failed insurgencies. One of 
those insurgencies, the UPDA, had emerged from the ashes of the former Ugandan 
military. Kony was early able to organize his movement with trained military leaders and 
soldiers from the former national army. These trained soldiers gave his insurgency an 
advantage, but less than that enjoyed by the two previous movements that had more 
closely followed the fall of the Obote regime.102 As Kony’s group quickly became the 
dominant group rebelling against Museveni in the north, former UPDA troops found a 
natural home with him. Although well trained, his initial pool of recruits was limited as 
the UPDA and HSM had both suffered significant losses and failed. Furthermore, the 
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amnesty granted by the Museveni government to UPDA and HSM troops drew thousands 
back into Ugandan society or directly into the NRA as government troops.103 
Recruiting from the HSM and UPDA gave Kony an early cadre of leaders and 
soldiers; however, the insurgency needed a reliable source of recruits to pose a viable 
threat to the government. From the start, Kony lacked a steady pool of recruits. While 
purporting to represent the interests of the oppressed Acholi, most elders and villages 
viewed Kony as unrepresentative of the people.104 This break deepened in the early 
1990s as Kony felt unsupported by the Acholi during the failed peace talks. The LRA 
then began to prey on the Acholi.105 This forced the LRA to turn to other means to build 
and replenish its ranks. 
Deprived of significant numbers of volunteers, the LRA resorted to coercion and 
kidnapping in order to fill its ranks. Children were kidnapped in large numbers. They 
were often forced to commit atrocities against their own families or villages, inhibiting 
them from returning home. This technique of exploiting children has enabled the LRA to 
consistently regenerate its forces.106 As Feldman points out, “the LRA’s ability to survive 
for all these years is a testament to its command, tactics, and almost inexhaustible supply 
of involuntary recruits.”107 
Despite a lack of voluntary recruits, the group has not only demonstrated the 
ability to kidnap its way to sufficient manpower, but has also demonstrated a remarkable 
ability to maintain terrorist operations despite its small numbers. Over time, its estimated 
numbers have fluctuated from thousands to perhaps less than 200—with current estimates 
of its strength outside of Uganda at between 150 and 200 core fighters.108 The insurgency 
has been defeated in Uganda, yet it has proven an ability to operate and regenerate in 
spite of small numbers. 
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2. Financing, Arming, and Training the Insurgency 
From the outset, the LRA professed to represent the interests of the oppressed 
Acholi people. Clearly, the Acholi ethnic group found itself in a disadvantaged position. 
The Museveni regime in its first decade of rule all but left the north and the Acholi out of 
its patronage networks, leaving the region economically and politically marginalized.109 
The north lacked the cash crops and economic development enjoyed by the south, further 
preventing the Acholi’s emergence from a depressed condition.110 Despite these 
circumstances, Kony did not enjoy the support from the population that normally might 
have been expected. By the early 1990s, the Acholi became legitimate LRA targets, as 
Kony became frustrated with a lack of support from what he viewed as “his people.” 
Overall, reports of Acholi support for the LRA are mixed. Some evidence suggests that 
certain villages and individuals have consistently provided the LRA with food and 
support.111 Whether from donated sources or through looting and coercion, Kony found 
the resources necessary to sustain an insurgent movement before any external support 
came his way. 
As discussed in Chapter I, outside support for an insurgency can be a double 
edged sword. The influx of resources can give a jolt to beleaguered forces, allowing them 
to train and operate far beyond how they normally could. In response to Uganda’s 
support for the SPLA, the LRA managed to gain support from Sudan in the 1990s. 
Khartoum shifted its stance from tolerating the LRA presence in Sudan, where Kony had 
his headquarters, to direct military support by 1994.112 This external support regionalized 
the scope of the insurgency, as the LRA now openly operated in southern Sudan, in 
addition to Uganda.113 
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Jackson underlines the boost this support gave the LRA: “Sudanese government 
aid has turned the LRA from an ‘army’ equipped with stones, rifles, and machetes into 
one equipped with landmines and machine guns.”114 The Sudanese support for the LRA 
amounted to a virtual proxy war between the two countries. This mutually subversive 
support continued until 1999 when both countries agreed to no longer intervene in the 
internal conflicts of the other (although some speculate lower levels of support to the 
LRA continued until 2004).115 The LRA was markedly strongest and most operationally 
effective when receiving support from Sudan. During this time, the insurgency inflicted 
the most harm on the people of northern Uganda and southern Sudan.116 Even so, the 
LRA was unable to gain the upper hand and never posed a legitimate threat to the 
government in Kampala. It was not even able to secure northern Uganda, its region of 
strength, as LRA controlled territory.  
With the end of Sudanese support, the LRA seemed to enter a period of slow 
decline, while it still managed to fight in the face of increasing UPDF pressure. The 
UPDF launched two major operations in the 2000s, both of which failed to make any 
significant impact on the LRA’s small but widely distributed network of forces.117 Once 
the LRA had vacated Uganda, taking up refuge in underpopulated and under-governed 
jungle areas of nearby DRC and Central African Republic, it extracted the resources it 
needed locally. Its dispersion over a wide area made it difficult for government forces to 
find and target the remaining LRA forces. Although the insurgency was well resourced at 
times, it was never sufficiently resourced to pose a legitimate threat to the state. This does 
not account for its longevity.  
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3. Territory and Safe Havens 
The LRA was a northern-based insurgency that primarily operated in northern 
Uganda and its northern neighbors. The insurgency never threatened the capital. Nor was 
it able to gain an operational foothold in other areas of Uganda. Although it succeeded in 
launching terrorist attacks against cities, the LRA never took, held, or governed any city. 
Thanks to the vast and largely rural nature of the north, the LRA attained a degree of 
freedom of movement.118 The Ugandan military’s reluctance to pursue direct combat 
with the LRA further protected the LRA’s position in the north Ugandan countryside.119 
Far from enjoying the safe haven enjoyed by other insurgencies that take and hold 
territory for extended periods of time, the LRA did occupy much of the rural north during 
the conflict. 
The LRA found its greatest asset beyond Uganda’s borders. During the 1990s, the 
group was headquartered in Juba, trained in camps throughout southern Sudan, and Kony 
himself was able to openly live in Juba with his family.120 Coinciding with Sudanese 
material support, the LRA was at its operational apex when headquartered in southern 
Sudan.121 Although having this safe haven failed to enable the LRA to topple the 
Ugandan government, it did contribute to the LRA’s growth and persistence through the 
1990s and early 2000s. This support may have contributed to the group’s longevity 
without substantial local Acholi support. 
Once Sudan ceased supporting the LRA, Khartoum permitted Ugandan troops to 
enter Sudan in pursuit of the LRA. At the same time, the SPLA equally put pressure on 
the LRA, eliminating its former safe haven.122 In Uganda, the Ugandan government and 
military increased the scale of forced relocation of much of the northern population into 
the IDP camps. This effectively allowed the Ugandan military to clear the countryside of 
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the LRA, and was central to the UPDF’s COIN campaign.123 With aid from Sudan cut 
off, the Ugandan military proved capable of defeating the insurgency. A strong 
insurgency would have fared better, especially after 20 years of seasoning against a 
presumably weaker state—but turned out not to be the case. 
4. The LRA’s Overall Relative Weakness 
The LRA could never have been assessed as relatively stronger than the Ugandan 
state. While it did enjoy patronage from Sudan for a period, the LRA did not enjoy the 
universal support of the Acholi or any other northern ethnic group. This lack of support 
was reflected in the LRA’s inability to maintain a stream of volunteer recruits, as well as 
in the scarcity of its supplies. The reason for the LRA’s 20-plus year existence in Uganda 
cannot be attributed to its strengths or its resources. 
C. UNDER-RESOURCED STATE HYPOTHESIS 
If an insurgency is insufficiently strong to gain outright victory, perhaps the state 
is also insufficiently strong to effectively counter and destroy it. This hypothesis could 
explain why an insurgency would be able to persist for an extended period of time. A 
weak state might be unable to put an end to the conflict, resulting in an extended status-
quo, wherein neither side destroys the other, but both persist. In the LRA’s case, it was 
never capable of posing a threat to the center of political power. At all times during the 
conflict the Ugandan state and military were sufficiently strong to prevent the LRA from 
posing a legitimate threat to the center of political power. This section demonstrates that 
Uganda was sufficiently resourced to counter the LRA by first examining the Ugandan 
economy and the foreign aid it was able to attract. It then analyzes the strength of the 
military, foreign military aid, and its capabilities during the LRA conflict. The argument 
to be made here is that Uganda was decidedly stronger than the LRA. It should have been 
able to put an end to the insurgency in a matter of years instead of allowing it to persist 
for over twenty. 
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1. Economic Strength 
Macro-economically, Museveni’s nearly 30 years rule has been an African 
success story. After periods of drastic decline during the Amin years, and stagnation 
during the early 1980s, Uganda has experienced sustained growth at an annual average of 
6%.124 The country became the international community’s poster child for post-conflict 
reconstruction from the late 1980s into the 1990s. Annual foreign aid averaged $650 
million from 1987–1990 and $738 million from 1991–2005.125 The Museveni 
government was exceptionally cooperative with the international community and 
international financial institutions. The government liberalized, reformed the economy, 
and qualified for funding and financial programs at an impressive rate. Foreign 
governments contributed and lauded the Museveni government for its growth-inducing 
market reforms.126 Despite these economic accomplishments, however, the substantial 
growth around the capital contrasted with the war-torn north. The remote northern 
regions of the country failed to benefit from this sustained growth. 
2. Military Strength 
While Museveni surrendered most budgetary controls to the international 
financial institutions in exchange for debt relief and financing, he retained control over 
the defense budget to combat the LRA in the north.127 This allowed him to increase the 
defense budget, year after year, from $42 million in 1992 to $260 million in 2010.128 
Uganda’s key western ally, the U.S., has contributed further millions to aid the defense 
sector in its fight against the LRA, supplying millions in peacekeeping funds, anti-terror 
funds, and logistical supplies. The U.S. also contributed hundreds of millions in 
humanitarian aid.129 Military support from the U.S. increased further thanks to the global 
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war on terror in the mid-2000s. This support culminated in 2011 with the deployment of 
special operations forces to provide assistance in the ongoing mission to capture Kony.130 
Museveni’s government enjoyed substantial international military assistance throughout 
the counter LRA conflict. Museveni also frequently cited the humanitarian crisis in the 
north and threat posed by the LRA to successfully solicit economic and military 
assistance.131  
International contributions coupled with Museveni’s budgetary increases should 
have created a formidable Ugandan military. The government deployed roughly 20,000 
troops to the north from 1986 onwards.132 The military also organized home guard 
militias. Although these militias received very limited training and resources, they added 
substantial numbers to the government’s counter-insurgency forces and increased 
regional security.133 Elite units such as the Presidential Guard were also deployed to the 
region from about 2003 on.134 Though it possessed only limited air assets, the army had 
the equipment necessary to attack and quickly move its troops to combat a less mobile 
foe.135 
Despite substantial military capabilities, however, government forces struggled to 
deal with the insurgency. According to Feldman, available government resources should 
have been adequate to defeat the LRA despite equipment shortfalls, inadequate training, 
and corruption. The military possessed sufficient resources to mount successful attacks 
against the enemy.136 Beyond resourcing, morale and professionalism must also be 
analyzed when assessing the military’s capacity. Branch indicates a lack of 
professionalism by UPDF military leaders might have contributed to the LRA’s 
persistence; he suggests that substantial resources were available, but misallocated..137 
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Instead, the government’s apathy for both the military and the plight of the north allowed 
corruption to take precedence over military success.  
If we look beyond resources, manning, and equipment, two additional facts 
strongly suggest that the Ugandan military was strong enough to defeat the LRA. Tripp 
points out that the NRA/UPDF had been successful in defeating the HSM and the UPDA, 
and had also confined the LRA to the north, suggesting that government forces were 
capable enough, if only there had been the will to eliminate the LRA.138 An equally 
significant point is highlighted by Doom and Vlassenroot: the LRA was very nearly 
defeated during Operation North in 1991. Instead of continuing to fight until defeat, 
however, Museveni abruptly halted the offensive and allowed the LRA to survive.139  
3. Sufficiently Strong State and Military 
The Ugandan military was sufficiently strong to counter the LRA. The fact that 
the military could have, but did not prevail, suggests that there might have been other 
reasons for the government to allow the LRA to persist. In sum, the hypothesis that the 
government and military were insufficiently resourced to counter the LRA does not fit. A 
more complete explanation must be sought elsewhere. 
D. ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF CONTINUED CONFLICT HYPOTHESIS 
While death and destruction are the visible results of conflict, some groups and 
individuals will seek to profit therefrom. When these individuals are in a position to 
manipulate the conflict for their continued benefit, they have little motivation to end it. In 
the case of the LRA, many individuals profited handsomely from the conflict, strongly 
disincentivizing an early end. The hypothesis that a war economy actively or passively 
motivated the continuation of the conflict, partially explains the LRA’s persistence. To 
prove the hypothesis, this section examines the economic incentives associated with the 
government’s desire to see the fight against the LRA continue. Next the section looks 
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more specifically at individual profiteering from the conflict. With millions of dollars 
available for the taking, the 20-year conflict with the LRA comes into focus. 
1. Government Profiteering 
Much has been written about the profitability of conflict, and the case of Uganda 
is no exception. While the north has been ravaged by the war, the rest of the country has 
benefitted from it. Museveni has been central to orchestrating the inflows of money from 
intergovernmental organizations, foreign donors, and other non-governmental aid 
organizations. Furthermore, the trickledown effect of this money has enriched individual 
members of government and military officers—who have also found profitable business 
opportunities thanks to the conflict. A conflict that could have been resolved within a few 
years was permitted to continue for the financial benefit of the well-connected. 
As an economically depressed region, the north has long attracted the attention of 
international aid organizations. The total amount of aid provided by private aid 
organizations is difficult to quantify. Mwenda indicates that the IDP camps, which were 
home to a majority of the north’s people, were almost exclusively funded by NGOs and 
humanitarian aid organizations.140 Essential services normally provided by the 
government were essentially outsourced. The United States alone provided $640 million 
in humanitarian aid between 2002 and 2011.141 With government services in the north 
funded by outsiders, the conflict enabled the government to ignore an entire region and 
allocate their share of healthcare, education, and other government services to the rest of 
the country. 
Back in the capital, the Ugandan government agreed to execute structural 
adjustment reforms. The central government handed over almost all budgetary control to 
the IMF. Museveni yielded to almost all foreign demands for economic reform.142 Using 
these concessions as leverage, Museveni convinced the international community to allow 
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the government to retain control over the defense budget. Increases to military 
expenditures were justified given the suffering of the people at the hands of the LRA.  
This helped to keep Museveni in the good graces of military leaders, maintaining 
his reputation as the father of the military.143 Through this strategy, Museveni increased 
the defense budget from approximately $42 million in 1992 to $260 million in 2010—
modest numbers by Western standards, but representing more than a six fold increase.144 
Significantly, these budget increases did seemingly little for front line troops. The money 
instead benefitted the central government’s patronage networks.145 In a popularly cited 
case, the government made a controversial purchase of four helicopters from Ukraine in 
1998—helicopters that were never airworthy.146 
In addition to gaining a free hand with the military budget, Museveni used the 
conflict with the LRA to elicit further military aid from international donors, most 
notably the U.S. Fisher argues that Museveni consciously framed the conflict in terms 
designed to acquire military support in the manner that was most advantageous to him, 
instead of focusing on an end to the LRA.147 His efforts yielded results. From 2008 
through 2016, the U.S. contributed millions of dollars through various security assistance 
programs—even after Kony’s group had fled Uganda. The U.S. also deployed over 100 
troops to directly assist in targeting the LRA.148 An increase in the availability of military 
money at the top facilitated its misallocation throughout the government and military 
structure. 
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2. Individual Profiteering 
While the conflict proved fiscally beneficial to Museveni’s central government, it 
proved personally lucrative to well-connected government and military officials. As 
previously mentioned, military officers had substantial opportunity for corruption in 
military acquisitions. This corruption had a deleterious effect on the front line troops’ 
ability to successfully fight the LRA.149 Another well-documented phenomenon was the 
UPDF’s use of so-called “ghost soldiers.” As is still common in many places, UPDF 
commanders were tasked with dispensing pay to their soldiers. As the units involved in 
combat in the north began to take casualties, officers found they could neglect to report 
these casualties and continue to draw pay for the fallen and pocket or redistribute it.150 
The practice spread rapidly. 
While “ghost soldiers” likely dated as far back as 1987, the government only 
began to take interest and investigate the practice in the early 2000s. The investigators 
found the issue to be rampant; one Major General (a nephew of Museveni) was found to 
have misappropriated approximately $35.5 million and was eventually convicted.151 
Mwenda suggests that the “ghost soldiers” cost the government upwards of $40 million 
per year.152 Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, whistleblowers, even those with 
access to Museveni, were ignored, imprisoned, and tortured, indicating tacit approval of 
the practice.153 This form of indirect patronage thus would have been one incentive for 
officers to ensure the prolongation of the conflict; a return to the barracks would require a 
more exact accounting of troops and a decrease in “ghost soldier” claims. 
Commanders found additional paths to enrichment when operating outside of 
Uganda. During the UPDF deployment to the DRC in the late 1990s, rumors and 
accusations were rampant that officers engaged in illicit resource trafficking and 
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extraction. Officers had gained experience building small businesses in the north and 
among the IDP camps, a practice they then continued in southern Sudan. Some small- 
scale trafficking involved supplies and military equipment but grew to include teak 
logging and smuggling.154 Among officers, such practices were generally not viewed as 
illicit or corrupt since the austerity measures had stripped the budget of education, 
healthcare, retirement pensions, and combat death benefits for their families. As officers 
came up with ways to care for their families, the government generally looked the other 
way.155  
Meanwhile, the rank and file, who did not receive the benefit of combat pay (an 
officer incentive) and often went unpaid when deployed outside the country, had 
significantly less access to such supplementary sources of income.156 The patronage 
networks tended to stay at the officer level. Consequently, morale was generally low 
among the soldiers fighting the LRA. With an officer corps intent on prolonging the 
conflict for fiduciary reasons, and an enlisted force with little motivation to engage in 
combat and risk their lives, Museveni found in the military a willing accomplice in 
keeping the conflict alive. 
3. Financially Convenient Conflict 
The conflict, while costing the lives of thousands (mostly Acholi), proved 
exceptionally profitable for the well-connected elite. For those who benefitted, 
enrichment became a compelling reason to prolong the conflict—even as they strove to 
portray active combat with the LRA. Such pervasive corruption could only exist in a 
structure based on patronage, and with the active or passive approval of the country’s 
most senior leaders, further building the case that the government consciously prolonged 
the conflict. The hypothesis that the insurgency endured due to economic factors is 
entirely tenable. Of course being able to participate in the benefits of such patronage 
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requires a seat at the table. In an emerging democracy, a conflict can present significant 
opportunities for those at the top to profit not just financially, but politically. 
E. POLITICAL BENEFITS OF CONTINUED CONFLICT HYPOTHESIS 
Yoweri Museveni has maintained his position as president of Uganda since 1987. 
Prior to 2005, the NRM was the only party permitted under the constitution. Even so, 
political wrangling and posturing was the norm. The NRM enjoyed its greatest popularity 
in the center of the country, where many of its principal leaders originated.157 From the 
outset, the north proved to be a persistent source of political opposition. In this context, 
the conflict with the LRA assumes a political aura.  
As outlined in Chapter I, a ruling politician might use internal conflict to 
consolidate political power, to marginalize a politically insignificant group, or to further 
alienate or fracture an entrenched opposition. This section explains the LRA conflict as a 
repression of the Acholi and other northern political opponents. Next it considers how the 
conflict served to maintain military loyalty in a country with a history of military coups 
d’état. It then explores the electoral benefits Museveni enjoyed thanks to the continued 
conflict. This further builds the case for Museveni intentionally allowing the LRA and the 
associated conflict to persist much longer than it would have otherwise. 
Despite the conflict in the north, Uganda experienced economic growth, and by 
the mid-1990s, was leading the region according to most economic growth indicators. 
Perhaps because of this growth, many within the country, as well as most outside 
observers, viewed the LRA conflict as a sideshow.158 When the LRA emerged as an 
insurgent group, the Museveni government had recently taken control and prevailed over 
the UPDA and HSM. The new government was now responsible for rebuilding a war-
torn country. The government could legitimately argue that other national issues were 
more important than dealing with a nascent criminal organization in an underpopulated 
and politically insignificant region. As Museveni derived most of his political support 
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from the center of the country, an insurgency confined to the north that terrorized a 
politically insignificant ethnic group helped him consolidate his political power. In this 
role, the LRA acted as an accomplice in marginalizing the Acholi. 
1. Ethnic Marginalization 
Any explanation of the conflict between the central government and the LRA is 
incomplete without consideration of the centrality of the Acholi as a marginalized group. 
As previously described, the Acholi dominated the pre and post-Amin military; actively 
resisted Museveni’s NRM; and subsequently supported the UPDA, HSM, and LRA.159 
For their parts, the Acholi came to view the conflict as a government war waged against 
them, with the LRA in league with the state in destroying the Acholi.160 Not surprisingly, 
until the LRA was pushed out of Uganda, the Acholi voted overwhelmingly against 
Museveni and his party at all levels of government.161 Because the conflict only affected 
the north and took such a heavy toll on the Acholi people, many viewed the conflict as 
intentional. 
At the same time, Museveni came to power with the support of the central and 
western ethnicities, and needed to maintain that support. It makes sense that Museveni 
would want to prevent the northerners from growing strong enough to challenge the new 
status-quo. The emergence and persistence of the LRA allowed Museveni to 
simultaneously satisfy both aims.  
Now (2016) approaching 30 years of continuous rule, Museveni has proven 
extremely adept at not only maintaining his hold on power, but doing so despite 
increasingly free and fair elections. The conflict with the LRA has aided this maintenance 
of popular support. Museveni has successfully cast the conflict in regional terms: 
dangerous northerners who seek to violently return to power at the expense of the 
peaceful majority.162 And indeed, the LRA has proven a sufficiently dangerous threat to 
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enable Museveni to portray himself as a protector of the Ugandan majority. Museveni 
further cultivated this image by limiting access to northern areas by NGOs, researchers, 
and foreign and domestic media.163 Such tactics minimized negative reporting while 
allowing Museveni a freer hand in prosecuting the war. To the Ugandan people, 
Museveni was presented as the only leader capable of protecting Uganda from a northern 
onslaught.164 
As long as the LRA continued to operate in the north, Museveni could maintain a 
disproportionally large part of the UPDF in that area. The presence of troops loyal to 
Museveni prevented the Acholi and other northern ethnicities from organizing a 
legitimate opposition. Building the IDP camps in the 2000s served the same purpose. 
Tight control of the camps prevented northerners from effectively organizing to pose a 
political threat to the government.165 The Acholi read of the situation was that Kony was 
being used as an instrument of the repressive government.166  
2. Military Control 
Maintaining control of the military has been an important aspect of Museveni’s 
rule, especially in a country where previous changes of power were by coup d’état. 
Directing the military against a specific foe allowed Museveni to maintain his esteemed 
status as the father of the army.167 The conflict also allowed officers to supplement their 
income, as previously discussed. This ensured their ongoing loyalty. 
In addition the conflict allowed the government to retain budgetary control over 
the military. This enabled Museveni to maintain higher troop levels than would have been 
internationally acceptable in peacetime. As we have seen, the conflict with the LRA also 
justified what ultimately became a fivefold increase in military spending. With this, too, 
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Museveni purchased the political loyalty of his military officers and keep a lot of soldiers 
employed.168 
3. Electoral Motivations 
From the outset, Museveni consistently framed the conflict as regional in nature: 
us versus them. This categorization transferred to Museveni’s electoral strategy. As Van 
Acker explains, Museveni employed a divide-and-rule strategy, promoting the image of 
“internal outsiders” in order to marginalize opponents.169 Continued conflict in the north 
assisted him in doing this; Museveni and the NRM protected the center and prevented the 
recurrence of northern atrocities. Museveni did not need the support of northerners or 
Acholi for electoral success. Instead, conflict with the marginalized ethnic group served 
to rally the center to his government. 
Museveni was also able to use the conflict to imply that other presidential 
candidates would fail to maintain a sufficiently hardline approach against a violent and 
dangerous LRA—only Museveni would be able to protect the people and confine the 
conflict to the distant north. However, the ruling party used even more aggressive tactics. 
For instance he imprisoned some opponents, to include perennial presidential opposition 
candidate Kizza Besigye.170 Opponents were often spuriously charged with collaborating 
with the LRA. The conflict was also occasionally used as an excuse to curb civil liberties 
and silence opposing voices while outwardly depicting his regime as a liberal 
democracy.171 Interestingly, the presidential election of 2011, with the LRA largely 
defeated and a well organized opposition gaining popularity, Museveni had to spend 
millions from the federal budget to maintain his seat—making the election the most 
costly single event in the history of the country.172 Without a conflict to leverage, 
reelection apparently became much more difficult. 
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4. Political Conflict 
Museveni drew substantial political benefit from the two decades-long war with 
the LRA. Early on the conflict helped him consolidate power and retain military support. 
Later, the conflict served as justification for increased military spending, tighter controls 
on personal freedoms, suppression of northern oppression, and as insurance against 
growing electoral opposition. Because, Museveni’s political constituents maintained a 
largely negative view of northerners, the conflict also provided a convenient excuse for 
preventing northerners’ return to the center of power. As Museveni’s tenure lengthened 
alongside that of the conflict, the LRA proved extremely helpful to him as he balanced 
political control with elections. His willingness to hold increasingly free and fair 
elections has ensured continued foreign aid that in turn has protected the patronage 
networks Museveni has needed to retain his political and military support. The relatively 
small LRA was probably the most effective political tool Museveni could wield to 
maintain his power. 
F. CONCLUSION 
When confronting the question of why the LRA conflict has endured for so long, 
Van Acker proposes three possibilities. “Either the LRA is strong…Or the UPDF is 
weak…Or the war in the north is a façade for other goings on.”173 This chapter has 
consequently considered all three: the “strong LRA” hypothesis, “under resourced 
Uganda” hypothesis, and the economic and political rationale for continued conflict. 
While a cogent argument can be made in support of each hypothesis, Van Acker’s “other 
goings on” holds the strongest explanatory power. 
The LRA benefitted early on from a marginalized and alienated Acholi population 
eager to fight for its return to prominence. When the relationship between the LRA and 
the Acholi soured, the LRA managed to procure patronage from Sudan to support their 
operations. However, this support was never adequate to turn the LRA into a legitimate 
threat to the central government. Meanwhile, the Ugandan government, although 
weakened by corruption, poor military leadership, and low morale among the rank and 
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file, was always capable of engaging the LRA and had multiple opportunities to put an 
end to the conflict. The Ugandan military further benefited from yearly budgetary 
increases and international support. Finally, and most significantly, a myriad of other 
political and economic clues suggest that the perpetuation of the conflict might have been 
intentional.  
On multiple occasions, a consistent application of force, likely could have 
eliminated the LRA. The government often pressed under-resourced troops into battle 
with the best and strongest units held in reserve. It inexplicably halted campaigns on the 
verge of success, and tacitly tolerated rampant corruption. Officers and government 
officials alike profited from the conflict through the utilization of “ghost soldiers,” 
corrupt acquisition deals, and outright looting and smuggling. Museveni also partially 
benefited from the continued repression and marginalization of the Acholi people who 
never supported his regime. 
While Kony and his small coterie of senior leaders and devoted followers 
continue to terrorize parts of the DRC and the Central African Republic, northern Uganda 
has enjoyed relative peace since the late 2000s. Peace should not have taken so long to 
come to northern Uganda. But today, northern cities are flourishing. Gulu, once at the 
center of the conflict zone, has been the fastest growing city in Uganda for much of the 
past decade while the newly constructed hospital in nearby Lira is on par with any in the 
capital.174 For all intents and purposes, the insurgency that persisted in the country for 
over 20 years has all but concluded. Meanwhile, as the door was closing on the LRA in 
the early 2000s, Boko Haram began its reign of terror in northern Nigeria. Why has an oil 
rich Nigeria been equally unable to deal with a perpetually violent insurgency? 
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III. NIGERIA AND BOKO HARAM 
Early in 2015, with an election mere months away, Nigeria’s President Goodluck 
Jonathan seemed to recognize that he faced a tenuous prospect at reelection. The violent 
insurgency that had ravaged the north of the country since 2003 was responsible for over 
6,300 civilian deaths in 2014 alone.175 Boko Haram had progressed from random terrorist 
acts and had successfully held territory across northeastern Nigeria. The Nigerian security 
forces had been unable, or perhaps unwilling, to counter Boko Haram’s territorial gains. 
With presidential elections scheduled for March, President Jonathan realized that despite 
the advantages of incumbency, his reelection prospects were dim largely due to the 
abysmal situation in the north.  
The Independent Electoral Commission decided to postpone the election by six 
weeks. This delay was meant to enhance the security provisions for voters, especially in 
light of Boko Haram threats to violently disrupt the election.176 During the pause, the 
administration organized and launched a concerted military assault on Boko Haram, 
perhaps the first focused operation against Boko Haram in its 12-year reign of violence. 
With the help of mercenaries and forces from Chad and Niger, the Nigerian security 
forces cleared territory held by Boko Haram and reestablished government control in an 
area roughly the size of Belgium.177 Nearly 30 million turned out to vote in the election 
including large numbers in the areas most affected by Boko Haram.178 The gains against 
Boko Haram proved to be too little-too late for President Jonathan; however, as the 
opposition candidate Muhammadu Buhari easily won the election.179 Although 
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weakened, Boko Haram continues to be a difficult problem for even a more resolute 
Buhari administration to handle. 
Why did President Jonathan wait until the last six weeks before the election to 
finally launch a decisive campaign against Boko Haram? How has the largest country in 
Africa (in terms of GDP and population) allowed the world’s most deadly insurgency to 
grow and persist within its borders?180 Is this persistence explained by a 
disproportionately strong insurgency, an unexpectedly under-resourced state, or by some 
other economic or political reason?  
The case of Nigeria’s response to Boko Haram is particularly enlightening by 
virtue of the country’s oil wealth and relatively robust economy. The country’s military 
had been viewed as among the most capable on the continent and a regular contributor to 
ECOWAS and UN missions.181 In spite of these indications of state strength, Boko 
Haram has persisted for over a decade. Similar to Uganda’s experience, the insurgency in 
Nigeria has persisted because of the economic and political benefits gained by Nigeria’s 
elite. To demonstrate this thesis, this chapter begins by outlining the history of the 
conflict, the growth of Boko Haram and the government’s response to the threat. It then 
analyzes whether the insurgency’s persistence can be explained by its relative strength or 
by the government’s relative weakness. Finally, the chapter demonstrates the economic 
and political explanations for Boko Haram’s persistence.  
A. HISTORY OF NIGERIA/BOKO HARAM CONFLICT 
In its current form, most date the birth of Boko Haram to around 2002 or 2003. In 
this guise, it was the product of a young Muslim extremist named Mohammad Yusuf. 
Boko Haram’s true roots, however, reach much further back in time, predating British 
colonization. This section begins by briefly summarizing the history of extremism in 
Nigeria. It then traces the roots of Boko Haram to the Maitatsine uprisings in the early 
                                                 
180 Dionne Searcey and Marc Santora, “Boko Haram Ranked Ahead of ISIS for Deadliest Terror 
Group,” New York Times Nov 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/africa/boko-haram-
ranked-ahead-of-isis-for-deadliest-terror-group.html?_r=1. 
181 Jeffrey Julum and Daniel Evans, “Exploring Networks Competing for Influence: Kano State, 
Nigeria,” Small Wars Journal (2015), 5. 
 49
1980s. The section then looks more closely at the birth of Boko Haram in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, and its turn to violence around 2003. Finally, the section charts the 
extreme violence that began in 2009 and continued through the administration of 
President Jonathan. 
1. Pre-Independence Roots of Extremism 
The first major turn of the region toward religious renewal or fundamental Islam 
began under the influence of Uthman Dan Fodio in the late 18th century. Seeking 
preeminence over the ruling Emirs, Dan Fodio conquered much of modern day northern 
Nigeria by 1810.182 The resulting kingdom was reorganized as the Sokoto Caliphate, 
governed by Shaykh Uthman Dan Fodio and his descendants who became Sultans. The 
caliphate cemented a close association between religious and political rule in the 
region.183 This new government also brought education and Islamic teaching to the 
people, previously a privilege of the elite.184 Sokoto rule entrenched a strict religious 
education that contrasted with the secular education that would arrive with the colonial 
and independent Nigerian state. 
The British Empire established its foothold in the region at Lagos early in the 19th 
century. The British extended their rule up the Niger river into the Muslim region 
beginning in 1894.185 As British power in the region increased, the Sokoto Caliphate’s 
power declined. The sultan was killed in battle with British troops in 1903, cementing 
British rule of the region.186 Local emirs, eager to maintain their power, aligned 
themselves with the victorious British, distancing themselves from the will of the 
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people.187 The seat of power, however, transferred from the Caliph to the governor of the 
northern Nigeria colony.  
Consistent with indirect rule, the British governor of northern Nigeria respected 
the wishes of the Muslim emirs and prevented Christian missionaries from establishing 
schools and churches. The banning of Christian-supported schools in the north had the 
unintended consequence of leaving the north with its own Islamic schools in contrast to 
widespread western education of the south. Southern mission schools were eventually 
responsible for educating an entire generation of Nigerian leaders.188 This education gap 
filled the colonial civil service with southerners, while northerners held less than 1% of 
these positions at independence.189 As Ekeh argues, those who were able to attain a 
western education were at a distinct advantage in colonial and post-colonial states.190 
Further economically distancing the north from the south, oil discoveries in the Niger 
River delta late in the colonial period assured a southern bias in industrial 
development.191 By virtue of the decisions of British colonial leaders and those of the 
northern emirs, the more densely populated Muslim north economically developed at a 
much slower pace. 
Fundamentalist ideologies in the spirit of Dan Fodio’s jihad endured in such 
economically alienating conditions. During the colonial period numerous violent 
uprisings of fundamental Islamists were brutally put down by British-led forces at the 
request of threatened local emirs.192 Simultaneously, calls for independence throughout 
Nigeria grew louder through the 1950s. Independence parties sprang up throughout the 
northern region calling for freedom and equality, in opposition to not only the British, but 
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also their vassals, the emirs.193 Nigerian elites drew up colonial constitutions in the early 
1950s and divided political power equitably by region and population. This had the 
consequence of over representing the more densely populated north over the more 
educated but sparsely populated south.194 At independence, the dominance of southerners 
in the civil service stood in contrast to the north’s majority in parliament. To balance the 
power at the top, a federal system established a rotation between north and south at the 
most senior levels of government.195 Regional and ethnic distrust coupled with economic 
inequality (both regionally and between elites and peasants) assured a difficult path for an 
independent Nigeria. 
2. Post-Independence Extremism 
Independent Nigeria experienced substantial turbulence during its first few 
decades, enduring a civil war and military rule interspersed with brief periods of 
democratic governance. The north continued to be economically repressed in comparison 
to the south. Meanwhile, extremist ideologies continued to make inroads among the 
underprivileged northern population. Wahhabi-Salafist clerics, financed out of the 
Arabian Peninsula, found fertile ground for an extremist ideology.196 Fundamentalist 
clerics have preached their intolerant and violent variations of the religion in Northern 
Nigeria and their teachings have maintained a small but significant following throughout 
the period. However, it is from the late 1970s and into the Maitatsine rebellions of the 
early 1980s, that Boko Haram can trace its earliest manifestations. 
Generally, the state security apparatus was at a loss as to how to deal with 
extremist movements. Extremist preachers were arrested and subsequently released, 
gatherings were inconsistently broken up, and authorities failed to confront even armed 
groups. Mohammad Marwa, the founder and inspiration of the subsequent Maitatsine 
uprisings, exemplified this government ambivalence; he was repeatedly arrested in the 
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1970s, but his group was never formally charged nor broken up despite the group’s 
increasingly violent tendencies.197 At the time, Marwa’s group was one of many 
preaching a violent ideology. 
Similar to earlier and later fundamentalist movements, Marwa preached a return 
to the so-called Islam of the prophet. He derided contemporary culture, education, and the 
secular state that imposed it—to include the Islamic leadership that colluded with the 
government.198 Between 1975 and 1980, Marwa’s group grew from approximately 2,000 
followers to roughly 10,000, comprising a formidable force for ill-prepared national 
police forces.199 A government crackdown in 1981 launched the initial violence in Kano 
state, in which approximately 4,000 people died, including Marwa. Thousands of other 
followers were imprisoned.200  
Indicating the government’s inability to comprehend and subdue the movement, 
over 1,000 of Marwa’s followers were released from prison in 1982. These newly 
released radicalized Islamists quickly reignited the conflict and launched rebellions 
throughout northern Nigeria through 1985.201 The police and government’s inability to 
address the rebellion and its underlying causes led Hickey to predict, at the time, that 
“Nigeria will be under the shadow of Maitatsine for some time to come.”202 In total, by 
1985 the Maitatsine rebellions would claim more than 10,000 lives, motivate a tenfold 
increase in the size of the national police force, and sow additional seeds of fundamental 
extremist ideology throughout northern Nigeria. 
The Maitatsine uprisings demonstrated the allure of a violent extremist ideology 
in an economically repressed area. It also showcased the relative inability of the Nigerian 
state to counter a modestly sized rebellion. 10,000 insurgent combatants among a 
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population of millions should have been defeated by a determined military and police 
force, especially given the concentrated attacks by the Maitatsine rebels. Although 
uprisings of the same scale as Maitatsine diminished until the rise of Boko Haram, the 
underlying causes of the movement persisted. Boko Haram bears much in common with 
its predecessor, largely due to the inability of the government to address these underlying 
causes. 
3. Persistent Extremism 
The late 1980s and 1990s continued to see numerous violent movements arise in 
the economically repressed north of Nigeria. Oil wealth and investment in the southwest 
of the country turned Lagos into a vast metropolis, while the government constructed a 
showcase new capital at Abuja in the center of the country. This oil revenue also 
entrenched rampant corruption, leaving little left over for development in the rest of the 
country. In this environment, successor groups to Marwa’s, as well as less ideologically 
motivated criminal groups, continued to plague the underdeveloped north.  
During this period, Nigeria was ruled by a series of military dictators, coming to 
power through successive coups. The generally more conservative and Islamic north had 
repeatedly called for the institution of sharia, or Islamic law, in the northern states. 
Allowances for this form of law existed in the previous 1978 constitution.203 
Consequently, northern elites were able to retain control in their areas, while also 
demonstrating to the people their shared devotion to religion. When the ruling generals 
agreed to a new constitution and democratic elections in 1999, northern leaders quickly 
renewed their call for sharia law in the northern states. Most northern states subsequently 
instituted sharia law, enacting a dual legal system where sharia runs concurrently with 
secular law.204  
Despite this seeming success for Islamist practice, the actual application of sharia 
has not satisfied the demands of fundamentalists. Northern authorities have applied sharia 
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in a lenient form, without the beheadings and amputations undertaken elsewhere.205 This 
relatively limited application of sharia also falls significantly short of that advocated by 
fundamentalist and extremist teachers. This form of sharia has allowed the extremist 
groups to target the elite and moderate practitioners of the faith as much as, if not more 
than, Christians and government officials.206 The government never directly confronted 
the extremist undercurrents pervading the north. 
4. The Birth of Boko Haram 
Boko Haram’s founding is generally attributed to Mohammad Yusuf, a high 
school drop-out from Maiduguri, Borno state. He was born in 1970, and received his 
initial Islamic education in Niger and Chad, before returning to Nigeria and becoming 
associated with a series of extremist groups. Most histories of the group place Yusuf 
under the tutelage of a cleric named Lawan Abubakar around 1995, who led a group 
known as Sahaba or Shabaab.207 Lawan’s group is generally considered to be the 
precursor of Boko Haram. Yusuf, however, was more radical than his teacher. In the 
early 2000s when Lawan left for further study in Saudi Arabia, Yusuf took control of the 
group and began to preach his interpretation of Islam.208 Yusuf’s ideology rejected 
western culture, education, and science, and espoused violence against any system that 
fell short of his interpretation of Islamic law.209 Prior to 2005 the group was known as 
Shabaab, the Nigerian Taliban, and Yusufiyyah, but subsequently came to be popularly 
identified as Boko Haram—referring to Yusuf’s rejection of western education and 
culture. Yusuf’s group gained many followers, and his influence reached much further 
than his mosque in Maiduguri.  
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In 2003 the group began to be associated with violence to match its ideology. In 
December 2003, a small group of Yusuf’s disciples came into conflict with local 
residents, resulting in a violent four-day clash with police.210 The attacks and violence 
would continue sporadically during the next few years throughout northern Nigeria, 
police stations being the target of choice. The government did not attribute such low 
levels of violence to a legitimate insurgency, and federal authorities pursued little more 
than basic police action. Meanwhile Yusuf’s group continued to grow. By 2009, several 
state, local, and Islamic leaders recognized the subversive nature of Yusuf’s teaching, and 
monitored local groupings of Boko Haram members. Bauchi state formally restricted 
them from public preaching and recruitment.211 These restrictions and low level 
confrontations with police culminated in a major clash during the last week of July 
2009—initiating the international prominence of Boko Haram. 
Although reports as to exactly what happened differ, a general consensus exists 
that the opening round of violence occurred as a sizeable number of Yusuf’s disciples 
were on their way to a funeral for a group member. Local police stopped the group for a 
minor traffic violation and a skirmish broke out. Some police officers were shot, while 
some in the group were killed.212 Word quickly spread, fanned by public comments by 
Yusuf, leading to skirmishes at police outposts across Borno, Yobe, Bauchi and Kano 
states. Police surrounded Yusuf’s mosque in Maiduguri, and subsequently destroyed it.213 
The military was called in to help settle the unrest. The police arrested hundreds, with 
numerous reports of forced interrogations and extrajudicial killings.214 After five days, 
military forces found Yusuf and handed him over to the police. There is almost universal 
agreement that Yusuf was intentionally executed, although the police asserted that he was 
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killed while trying to escape.215 Although Yusuf’s death put an end to the July 2009 
uprising, the brutality inflicted by the police cemented Boko Haram’s resolve to counter 
such action, and also likely enhanced the group’s ability to recruit among the 
underprivileged of northern Nigeria.216 Approximately 700 members of Boko Haram 
were killed during that week in July 2009.217  
This uprising is considered Boko Haram’s “coming out.” It could no longer be 
dismissed as a low level criminal organization. It proved its ability to organize, train, 
equip, and mobilize fighters in coordinated attacks across four northern states in a 
relatively short span. The group publicized its intent to overthrow the government, 
reconstruct a caliphate, and institute sharia based on a strict and selective interpretation of 
Islam. The government now had the responsibility to prosecute a COIN campaign to 
counter and put an end to the insurgency. 
5. Political Environment and Government Reaction 
While Boko Haram was growing, the Nigerian government was a flawed and 
corrupt democracy. In the country’s transition to civilian democratic rule in 1999, former 
military dictator and Christian southerner Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president from 
the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). He was re-elected in 2003. In the 2007 election, 
northern Muslim Umaru Yar’Adua represented the party, and won against a fractured 
opposition. In 2010 Vice President Goodluck Jonathan took office following the death of 
Yar’Adua.218 A southerner, Jonathan won the party’s nomination and 2011 election. 
Many northerners, both within and without the PDP, felt slighted that a southerner took 
power when much of the country felt power should rotate to a northerner.219  
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While the insurgency sprang up in 2003, little evidence indicates that the 
Obasanjo administration viewed it as any more significant than any other criminal 
organization. Perhaps due to his experience and understanding of the socio-economic 
conditions prevalent in the north, Yar’Adua’s administration took the threat more 
seriously. In 2007, Yar’Adua ordered the security establishment to contain the violence 
and deal with the growing threat.220 As a result of the massive week-long regional 
uprising in July 2009, the president approved the stand up of a joint task force to address 
the insurgency.221 Yar’Adua’s appreciation of the threat, and how he would have 
subsequently addressed it, remains a matter of speculation, as by late 2009 illness sent 
him out of the country for treatment and Jonathan became acting president. 
6. Early Boko Haram Actions 
Following the uprising of 2009 and Yusuf’s death, Boko Haram seemingly 
dispersed and went underground.222 By mid-2010, suspicions of Boko Haram’s 
persistence reemerged as one of Yusuf’s lieutenants, Abubakar Shekau, announced 
himself, the group, and their aims of dismantling the Nigerian state on YouTube, and 
followed the announcement up with terrorist attacks. That year a group of Boko Haram 
fighters attacked a prison in Bauchi state and released approximately 700 prisoners, many 
of whom were suspected group members. Attacks on police outposts and prisons 
continued through 2010 and 2011, with churches, Christians, and moderate Muslims 
added to the list of legitimate targets.223 
The scope of the conflict grew in 2011 as Boko Haram targets extended beyond 
the northeastern states. Early that year, Jonathan ran for and won election. Shekau vocally 
and violently opposed his candidature, and the group targeted sites associated with the 
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election—to include an attack very close to Jonathan’s inauguration ceremony.224 
Subsequently, in August 2011, a suicide bomber drove a car bomb into the lobby of the 
United Nations Headquarters in Abuja, killing 21 people and injuring many more.225 
Two months previous, a similar suicide attack occurred at the National Police 
Headquarters, also in Abuja.226  
These attacks were significant for two reasons. First, these were the first Boko 
Haram attacks outside of northern Nigeria, suggesting an ability to extend the 
organization’s reach beyond its immediate power base. Second, these attacks were 
suspected to be the first employment of suicide bombers in Nigeria. Although this tactic 
is common elsewhere, it was believed to be incompatible with Nigerian values. These 
attacks suggested the growing influence of outside extremist groups who more routinely 
employ such tactics.227 Since this attack, Boko Haram attacks have occurred at least 
weekly throughout the country, with schools targeted as well. While such attacks killed 
many, the threat also discouraged thousands of children from attending school, 
potentially impacting future prosperity.228 By mid-2011, Boko Haram was clearly a 
serious insurgency, terrorizing vast areas of northern Nigeria, projecting violence beyond 
the region, and threatening the ability of the government to govern. 
7. Jonathan Administration 
In June 2011, newly elected President Jonathan ordered the creation of a military-
led joint task force (JTF) to counter Boko Haram. Prior to this, the police had maintained 
the lead in combatting the threat. The JTF sent thousands of troops to the area and 
enforced curfews, searches, and border closures, but meeting little success in curbing 
violence.229 By this time Boko Haram had grown sufficiently strong to counter most 
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routine government action. Despite a general lack of local support and a numerically 
sizeable COIN force, the group was still able to maintain freedom of action, ramping up 
the level of violent attacks year over year. By the middle of 2012 it was successfully 
holding terrain, extracting resources, and governing numerous towns.230 While security 
forces met with occasional successes, Boko Haram continued to prove adept at 
dispersing, regrouping, and growing, in spite of government action. 
In May 2013, Jonathan declared a six-month state of emergency, which was 
subsequently extended through 2014. This brought the central government in direct 
control of northern operations and reorganized the command structure under a single 
military division that reported directly to the Chief of Defense.231 The defense budget 
also grew massively during this period, from roughly $625 million in 2010 to $6.25 
billion in 2012–2014—a ten-fold increase.232 Despite the reorganizations, strategic focus, 
troop deployments, and budget increases, however, the government never gained the 
upper hand. Boko Haram continued to operate at will, taking-and-holding territory, and 
terrorizing the population. The group collected taxes, food, weapons, and any other useful 
resources, leaving the already poor residents destitute.233  
Headlining worldwide news in April 2014 was the night-time abduction of 
approximately 200 teenage girls from a boarding school in Chibok, Borno state. The day 
and week after the attack parents and local officials investigated the remains of the school 
and searched for the children, but were unsuccessful. Government forces were typically 
slow to respond.234 Within weeks the international press picked up the story and the 
Twitter hashtag #BringBackOurGirls spread worldwide. This international attention to 
the conflict won support from donors and foreign governments to assist in finding the 
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girls.235 The international attention also forced the Jonathan administration to increase its 
efforts to find the girls and combat Boko Haram. In response, more troops deployed to 
the region.236 Despite concerted international efforts, the girls have not been found, and 
most analysts believe they have been given to Boko Haram fighters as wives and spread 
throughout the vast operating area or have been killed in the ongoing violence. 
The kidnapping also drove Nigeria to reengage with neighbors Chad, Niger, and 
Cameroon to take a regional approach to combatting the insurgency.237 The governments 
formed a multi-national task force in early 2015 headquartered in N’Djamena, Chad, led 
by a Nigerian general, and funded principally by Nigeria and foreign donors.238 The 
multinational efforts have met significant success in curbing Boko Haram’s cross-border 
access. Chadian and Nigerien troops have met significant success in routing Boko 
Haram—to the extent that their success further demonstrated Nigeria’s inability to deal 
with a far-from-invincible Boko Haram.239  
Boko Haram’s rapid and violent growth marked Goodluck Jonathan’s presidency. 
As his first term was drawing to a close, Jonathan realized the ongoing conflict was 
hurting his chances of reelection. Violent episodes such as the kidnapping of the Chibok 
girls elevated the publicity of the conflict well beyond the confines of northern Nigeria, 
to the extent that previously loyal southerners questioned his leadership. Year over year, 
death totals increased, to the point that in 2014 and 2015 Boko Haram was responsible 
for more deaths than the much more publicly visible ISIS.240 In response, the highly 
successful combined military push in the Spring of 2015, outlined in the opening to this 
chapter, routed Boko Haram from the towns and villages it claimed for its caliphate. The 
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campaign dispersed the group to such an extent that the election was successfully held 
with less violence than in 2011.241 The brief six-week military operation was the most 
successful to date, retaking areas that in some cases Boko Haram had held for nearly six 
years.242 As a method to secure re-election, the effort was unsuccessful as Muhammadu 
Buhari, a northern Muslim, defeated Jonathan. 
8. Buhari Administration 
Buhari was the presidential candidate of the newly formed All Progressives 
Congress (APC). He benefitted from his regional and religious background, but also 
possessed an unimpeachable anti-corruption record and the ability to rally the disparate 
voices of various opposition parties. Buhari profited from elite defections from the PDP 
and easily won the northern Muslim states, but also succeeded in securing three Christian 
majority states. In the official tally, Buhari defeated Jonathan by 9 percentage points and 
an outright majority.243 To his credit, Jonathan peacefully conceded the election, marking 
the first time an opposition candidate democratically defeated an incumbent in Nigerian 
history.244 One of Buhari’s first proclamations upon inauguration was that the Nigerian 
security forces would defeat Boko Haram by the end of the year—a bold promise to a 
Nigerian public who had become skeptical of such past assertions.245 
Although the spring 2015 campaign had been successful in retaking Boko Haram 
held territory, the operation had killed relatively few insurgent fighters. The group 
followed the more traditional guerrilla tactic of falling back and dispersing, instead of 
giving-up casualties against a conventional force. This left the majority of Boko Haram’s 
cells intact, allowing them to regroup.246 As Buhari assumed control of the government, 
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he reorganized some aspects of the military and drove a policy of continued engagement 
in the north. The Nigerian military fortified the liberated towns and continued to put 
pressure on Boko Haram alongside multi-national troops. Operations in May 2015 
focused on Boko Haram hideouts and reportedly liberated around 1,000 women and girls, 
90% of whom were pregnant.247 The continued pressure in 2015 noticeably weakened the 
group, resulting in estimates that the number of active fighters had been halved from the 
previous year.248 This level of success by the government and security forces led Buhari 
to proclaim at the end of the year that Boko Haram was “technically defeated” despite its 
continued ability to launch frequent and deadly attacks. He was likely correct, however, 
when he explained that Boko Haram was no longer able to launch conventional attacks 
and seize and hold territory as it had for the previous half-decade.249 Could this conflict 
have been intentionally prolonged—to the benefit of some—similar to the conflict 
between the LRA and Uganda? 
B. STRONG INSURGENCY HYPOTHESIS 
Boko Haram has been a violent menace to Nigeria and its neighbors since 2009. 
During this time, the government security forces have pursued the insurgent group, yet 
have not succeeded in defeating it. This section explores the evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that Boko Haram is too strong for Nigeria and its allies to deal with. Through 
an examination of what is known about the group’s internal and external support, 
financial and materiel support, and safe-havens and territorial support, the chapter comes 
to the conclusion that it is not sufficiently strong to pose a legitimate threat to a 
reasonably strong Nigerian state. To support this assertion, this section begins by 
demonstrating the source of Boko Haram’s personnel support, followed by what is 
known about the group’s financial inflows. It then examines the group’s territorial 
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advantages, and how they contrast with the distinct lack of popular support for Boko 
Haram, support that an insurgency requires to be successful. 
1. Manpower 
A strong and persistent insurgency needs people, and needs to be able to 
continually recruit and replenish its forces. Violent confrontations with the government, 
arrests, and desertions all take their toll. Few specifics are known about Boko Haram’s 
total numbers. Based on its ideology, it is very possible that tens of thousands, if not 
hundreds of thousands, subscribe to and support the extremist ideology taught by Yusuf, 
Shekau, and other associated clerics. Onuoha suggested in 2010 that Yusuf had attracted 
as many as 280,000 adherents, spread out across 19 Nigerian states and neighboring 
countries.250 He was certainly referring to sympathizers rather than active fighters. 
Nevertheless, this is a sizeable number; it demonstrates the appeal of a message 
advocating the overthrow of a corrupt regime that has repressed the Muslim north among 
an impoverished population. 
The socioeconomic conditions prevalent in the north have made it relatively easy 
for an extremist doctrine to take root. In the north, 72% of the population falls below the 
poverty line; while that statistic is 27% in the south.251 Rates of public education 
attendance in the north continue to lag those of the south.252 An insurgency growing out 
of impoverishment and neglect is nothing new, and can historically be expected. Boko 
Haram had little difficulty recruiting in these conditions, despite a lack of support from 
mainstream Islam and northern elites. 
Beyond recruiting, Boko Haram proved particularly adept at spreading out its 
forces, retaining its leaders, and disengaging when faced with resolute government force. 
When Boko Haram curtailed its activities after Yusuf’s death, it dispersed its followers 
into groups spread across the country. This allowed it to continue to execute small and 
disassociated attacks throughout the north, while rendering it more difficult for the 
                                                 
250 Onuoha, “The Islamist Challenge,” 58. 
251 Oarhe, “Responses of the Nigerian Defense and Intelligence Establishments,” 69. 
252 Julum and Evans, “Exploring Networks,” 6. 
 64
government to locate and destroy the group.253 During much of Boko Haram’s most 
successful period between 2011 and 2014, the government was unsuccessful in 
eliminating any significant group leaders, indicating a strong ability to protect the central 
core of its organization.254 Also the group demonstrated a willingness to attack prisons to 
release group members, an easy and often repeated tactic for acquiring fighters.255 When 
confronted by government forces, the group routinely dispersed, yielding terrain in order 
to retain the ability to fight another day.256 Bodansky estimates that the early 2015 
campaign succeeded in halving the number of active fighters, yet it still likely maintains 
6,000-7,500 trained and equipped fighters around the Nigeria-Cameroon border, with an 
additional 5,000 further dispersed among the northern population.257 Taken together, 
Boko Haram proved particularly adept at retaining the forces it recruited and protecting 
its leaders. Maintaining sufficient manpower was never a significant issue for the group. 
2. Financing, Arming, and Training the Insurgency 
The group began ostensibly as a school of Islam under Abubakar and Yusuf. As is 
common, adherents paid for their instruction. Yusuf did particularly well as an Islamic 
teacher, and was able to afford many of the western extravagances that he was preaching 
against.258 Members paid him monthly dues, providing for his needs, but also for the 
sect’s mosque and eventually the seed money for an insurgency.259 It is also suspected 
that Yusuf profited from some elite local benefactors who made sizeable donations.260 
While this early source of revenue was sufficient for maintaining a school of Islam and 
providing social services to the adherents, it was certainly insufficient to outfit a 
legitimate insurgency.  
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The group seemed to have links prior to 2009 to other trans-national extremist 
organizations. Yusuf himself was arraigned but acquitted on charges of receiving 
financing from Al Qaeda.261 Some observers tie donations to wealthy patrons and 
purported charity groups originating in Gulf countries.262 These suspected links to other 
extremist organizations and overseas groups have yet to be definitively proven so it is 
difficult to speculate and analyze what impact such resources may have had.263 What is 
evident, however, is that the group had sufficient resources to fund, train, and equip 
thousands of fighters prior to July 2009. From 2010 on, banks were targeted as an 
additional source of funds.264 It is also suspected that local government leaders resorted 
to paying off the group in an attempt to prevent attacks in their areas.265  
As the group began taking and holding territory in 2012, it stripped away every 
resource available in the occupied territory.266 The group’s rapacious approach was 
ultimately counterproductive. By early 2016 it was unable to extract additional resources, 
and resorted to raiding villages for food, perhaps an indication that its former method of 
resource extraction had run its course.267 Despite the limited resources at hand, Boko 
Haram proved itself expert at maximizing resource procurement from an impoverished 
environment. 
Beyond financial resources, the insurgency required a sizeable quantity of 
weapons. As outlined in the historical portion of the chapter, the group’s first attacks in 
2003 and 2004 were against police stations—likely as attributable to arms procurement as 
to retribution. Boko Haram continued this tactic of raiding for weaponry throughout its 
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period of activity.268 The group’s strong financial resources also enabled the group to 
directly purchase weapons from corrupt soldiers and officers within the Nigerian 
military.269 Raids on police stations and military barracks have likely been the most 
common avenue for arms and ammo procurement.  
While the ideological indoctrination of insurgents came from within, evidence 
exists that some training of fighters has been facilitated by other terrorist organizations. 
The bombing of the UN building demonstrated the use of complex explosives and suicide 
attacks for the first time in Nigeria, indicating a transnational influence.270 More recently 
combat against ISIS in Iraq and Syria has unearthed evidence of Boko Haram fighters 
operating there, gaining training and experience to bring back to Nigeria.271 While these 
instances of outside training are likely exceptional, the experience gained abroad can 
quickly disseminate to fellow fighters, and influence Boko Haram’s capability. 
3. Territory and Safe-Havens 
Boko Haram was born in an urban environment among the poor and 
disenfranchised, while benefitting from elite sponsorship. When the group moved from 
extremist rhetoric to violence, it found refuge in under-governed areas of northern 
Nigeria where government enforcement was sparse. The dispersal of ill-equipped 
government forces enabled a careful Boko Haram to move around and operate, despite a 
lack of local support.272 Furthermore, while the local populace generally does not support 
Boko Haram, villagers are often compelled against informing on the group out of fear.273 
This has enabled the group to enjoy an internal safe-haven despite a hostile populace.  
Boko Haram’s success at taking and holding territory has also enabled it to create 
its own safe-havens. This territory has allowed for training and reconstitution of the force 
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in addition to resource extraction from the population.274 Similarly, Nigeria has long, 
sparsely populated borders with its northern and eastern neighbors. Niger and Chad have 
both demonstrated a strong will and determination to discourage Boko Haram activity 
within their countries. However, the long borders are virtually unenforceable, allowing 
Boko Haram to come and go at will.275 Sufficient coordination between the countries to 
deny cross-border movement and operations only came about following the Chibok 
kidnapping in 2014.276 Although Boko Haram has successfully exploited this difficulty, it 
likely gained more territorial benefit from within Nigeria. 
4. Boko Haram’s Overall Weakness 
Despite the resource strengths that have enabled Boko Haram to be enormously 
successful since 2009, it is difficult to attribute its longevity purely to relative strength. 
The next section illustrates the state’s significant resource advantage, further diminishing 
the credibility of this hypothesis. Most significantly, when the Nigerian government 
decided to retake Boko Haram held territory, Boko Haram melted away in the face of a 
determined foe.277 This military success demonstrated that Nigeria is fully capable of 
defeating Boko Haram and that Boko Haram is not sufficiently strong to pose a legitimate 
threat to the state. 
C. UNDER-RESOURCED STATE HYPOTHESIS 
If a state is sufficiently strong to counter the efforts of an insurgency, even a 
strong insurgency would have difficulty maintaining a high level of operations and 
persist. The state should have, in comparison to the insurgency, significantly greater 
resources to bring to the fight. As outlined in the previous section, Boko Haram has been 
able to collect sufficient resources to persist, but likely insufficient to truly threaten the 
central government. The government of Nigeria, on the other hand, governs the largest 
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economy in Africa. It is the largest oil producer on the continent, pumping 2.5 million 
barrels per day in 2015.278 These facts alone suggest that if any African country has the 
means to defeat an insurgency, it is Nigeria. 
This section demonstrates the advantages Nigeria possesses in its fight against 
Boko Haram but also how much of these resources have been wasted or insufficiently 
applied. To evaluate this hypothesis, this section initially examines the economic data and 
Nigeria’s ranking on the continent. It then looks at available military and police 
resources, as well as the international aid and security assistance that have been donated 
to defeat Boko Haram. Finally, the section briefly examines the effects of corruption and 
its degradation of the security forces dedicated to the Boko Haram fight. While 
corruption has taken its toll, Nigeria remains sufficiently strong to effectively counter the 
insurgency. 
1. Nigeria by the Numbers 
Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa, its number one oil producer, and has the 
continent’s largest population. By one estimate, by 2040, Nigeria will possess one fifth of 
Africa’s economic capability and will continue growing at a phenomenal rate.279 This 
rate of growth will also give the country the largest per capita increase in GDP despite 
any setbacks due to insurgency or corruption. Nigerian per capita GDP has been rapidly 
growing since before the country’s transition to democracy in 1999.280 Oil is responsible 
for much of this growth. Sustained high oil prices through the late 2000s helped maintain 
average growth of 8.5% through 2013.281 In 2014, with record high oil prices, GDP grew 
by 10%.282 Oil accounts for roughly 85% of government revenue, and in 2014 it brought 
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in $88 billion.283 The drop off in oil prices in 2015 certainly will pose difficulties in the 
years to come. Nevertheless, during the period in which Boko Haram enjoyed its greatest 
success and growth, the government amassed vast oil revenue. Inflows of foreign aid and 
military assistance have been significant; however, in comparison to Nigeria’s own 
ability to generate revenue from oil, they do not represent a proportionally large sum.284  
The government has spent substantial amounts of money on the security sector 
and has dramatically increased that funding during the height of the insurgency. The 
defense budget has been maintained at these levels since then. Despite the budget 
increased discussed previously, the military was not able to successfully complete the 
campaign against Boko Haram. This would indicate that resources alone are not 
definitive. There may be another factor at play, however: corruption. Some analysts 
suggest that the amount of money stolen is deceptively large, with relatively less going to 
frontline troops and equipment than would be expected. Of the $6 billion military budget, 
around 10% has been spent on weapons and equipment, with the rest going to 
headquarters and military staffs, or disappearing entirely.285  
Meanwhile, the national police force has not been funded to the same level. The 
average police officer is trained and equipped at roughly half the level of a soldier. The 
police are particularly lacking in intelligence and surveillance training and equipment.286 
The police should have received commensurate budgetary increases alongside the 
military, as both were fighting the same fight against Boko Haram. In short, despite 
substantial government resources, and a sizeable military budget, the funds have not been 
directed to the areas most critical to defeating an insurgency. 
2. International Assistance 
The struggle against Boko Haram has always been international due to the 
group’s cross border activity. Also ethnic, religious, and historical links have existed in 
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the border areas that predate national boundaries. Post-independence, Niger, Chad, 
Cameroon, and Nigeria, united to create the Lake Chad Basin Commission, primarily to 
regulate and protect water rights in the region, but also to ensure security across the 
southern Sahel and Lake Chad area.287 This history of cooperation in the region has since 
served as a template. Chibok spurred reengagement by the commission, resulting in a 
multinational joint task force (MNJTF) to facilitate military cooperation.288 Beyond 
security, the commission also implemented a $65 million emergency development 
initiative to ameliorate the conditions of poverty that contributed to the insurgency.289 
The MNJTF was instrumental in the successful routing of Boko Haram in early 2015. 
Chadian and Nigerien soldiers were key to the coalition’s success.290 Regional support 
and cooperation, although likely the most significant to Nigeria’s counter-Boko Haram 
efforts, is not the only outside support Nigeria has received over the course of the 
conflict. Western support has also contributed. 
Nigeria receives roughly $700 million in various foreign assistance programs 
from the United States; 87% of which is for health programs.291 Peacekeeping funding 
(PKO), foreign military financing (FMF), and anti-terrorism assistance total about $7-8 
million, with much of that amount earmarked for pre-existing programs.292 In all, about 
20 countries have sold or provided Nigeria with military hardware in sufficient quantities 
to be helpful in combatting Boko Haram.293 In May 2014, the U.S. deployed an unarmed 
surveillance drone and 80 personnel to Chad to assist in locating the Chibok girls and to 
provide additional intelligence on Boko Haram movements.294 While helpful, most 
international security assistance to Nigeria has been relatively insignificant, aside from 
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the efforts of the MNJTF. Overall, as Campbell argues, Nigeria’s financial independence 
due to its oil revenue renders any foreign assistance minimally significant.295 This 
independence also limits the ability of outside actors to leverage change and reduce 
corruption within Nigeria. 
3. Effect of Corruption 
Counteracting Nigeria’s sizeable resources, corruption has become endemic 
within Nigeria. The vast oil money has rendered such acts relatively easy and common, 
and generally expected within the government. Some estimates put the total amount of 
money stolen from the oil sector during the roughly six year Jonathan administration 
around $85 billion (oil exports were valued around $80 billion in 2014 alone).296 Despite 
Nigeria’s vast oil wealth, the effects of such corruption robbed the security services of 
resources that could have been used to fight the insurgents. Simultaneously, a culture that 
tolerated such acts makes it easy for an insurgent organization to thrive and rail against 
the evil corruption of the government, facilitating recruitment and nurturing 
sympathizers. 
Even though corruption may be deeply entrenched, the people of Nigeria 
demonstrated their disgust when it voted for the opposition candidate. Muhammadu 
Buhari ran on a platform of anti-corruption, and has a proven track record in countering 
such illicit action.297Upon taking office, Buhari replaced all of the military service chiefs, 
carefully selecting their replacements. This suggests the level of corruption that pervaded 
the military as well as the oil sector. Some of this corruption was overt. The military 
provided substantial benefits to officers and headquarters, leaving most soldiers 
underpaid and underequipped.298 Such a culture of entitlement in the officer corps does 
not lend itself to battlefield determination. As late as 2013, only 5,600 troops were 
deployed to northern Nigeria, and a general officer was not deployed until the stand-up of 
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the 7th division in Borno state in August of that year.299 Beyond overt corruption, poorly 
compensated soldiers subsist on petty corruption. The suicide bomber of the UN building 
in Abuja allegedly paid bribes along his route through checkpoints to the capital to 
execute his mission.300 Continued high-level corruption during the Jonathan 
administration continued to leech resources from all levels of the national and military 
budgets. 
4. Nigeria’s Overall Strength 
Although weaknesses appear below the surface, and corruption takes a huge toll 
on state capacity, the data generally indicates that Nigeria has sufficient resources to 
defeat Boko Haram. Nigeria’s ability to rapidly and decisively drive Boko Haram out of 
its territory during six weeks in early 2015 demonstrated the ability of the state to defeat 
the insurgency if it focuses on the threat.301 This also indicates that Nigeria is capable of 
defeating the insurgency if it wants to, disproving the strong insurgency hypothesis. 
Furthermore, President Buhari was elected primarily on a platform of anti-corruption and 
a promise to put an end to Boko Haram. Nigeria’s willingness to do so is explored in the 
next two sections. 
D. ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF CONTINUED CONFLICT HYPOTHESIS 
This section explores the hypothesis that the Nigerian government has 
intentionally allowed Boko Haram to persist so that officials and other elites can continue 
to profit from the conflict. First, the section explores the ways that the conflict has 
profited the military. Next the section looks closer at the benefits gained through an 
influx of foreign assistance to fight the insurgency. Finally, it examines instances of 
individual profit from the conflict. Based on the fairly limited amount of information 
currently available, this hypothesis partially explains the persistence of Boko Haram. 
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1. Economic Benefits to Military 
Traditionally among the most capable in Africa, Nigeria’s military has had a 
historical impact in the region and has supported UN missions worldwide.302 
Nevertheless, being a country that has been shaped by military coups, civilian rule since 
1999 has intentionally underfunded the military to prevent it from seizing power.303 The 
army consists of roughly 90,000 troops, a number that has not significantly changed for 
decades.304 Prior to the insurgency, the military budget fluctuated, but was generally 
between $600 million and $800 million.305  
This army proved adequate to combat the insurgency in the Niger delta (which 
was concluding as Boko Haram was gaining momentum). Nevertheless, as previously 
discussed, the military budget grew roughly tenfold from 2010–2012 to well over $6 
billion, where it has remained. Such an increase was made possible by record-high oil 
prices during this period, and justified by the emergence of Boko Haram.306 The increase 
was intended for equipment procurement to combat Boko Haram. After a decade of 
civilian rule and paltry defense budgets, military leadership recognized in Boko Haram 
an avenue to reestablish military might. Continued high levels defense spending was tied 
to the Boko Haram conflict, decreasing the incentive to defeat the insurgency. 
Relatively little evidence has emerged implicating senior military leaders in graft 
from such a substantial military budget, but this is not surprising given the recency of 
events. However, since the inauguration of President Buhari there have been suggestions 
that certain key members of the previous government may have profited handsomely 
from the budget increase. Upon taking office, President Buhari dismissed all of the 
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service chiefs and appointed more trustworthy officers to take their places.307 While not 
an outright indictment, the action certainly calls into question the fiscal responsibility of 
the dismissed officers. In August 2015, President Buhari created a 13-man commission 
responsible for investigating cases of corruption in weapons procurement during the 
previous five years and, in November 2015, he ordered the arrest of the former national 
security advisor on charges of stealing $2 billion in funds through fraudulent weapons 
procurement deals.308 It is highly likely that senior military leaders have directly profited 
from continued conflict with Boko Haram, thus discouraging their willingness to put an 
end to the conflict. 
2. Boko Haram as Justification for Increased Foreign Aid 
A substantial amount of foreign and military aid worldwide is tied to countering 
terrorism. Boko Haram’s existence allowed the Jonathan administration to point to a 
violent terrorist organization within its borders as justification for increased foreign 
aid.309 The bombing of the UN building in Abuja garnered international attention. It also 
demonstrated Boko Haram’s reach beyond the remote northern states, legitimizing the 
threat to the government and international organizations operating in Nigeria.310 Now as 
a fellow combatant in the war on terror, Nigeria formally qualified for western counter-
terrorism assistance. Overall, foreign assistance has never been statistically significant 
due to Nigeria’s massive oil wealth, nor has it been the lever for good governance that 
Western donors apply in other African states.311 Nevertheless, the conflict with Boko 
Haram has helped broaden the scope of foreign assistance.  
Since 2009, Nigeria has procured military equipment from over 20 different 
countries.312 The conflict with Boko Haram also brings international attention to the 
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depressed economic condition of northern Nigeria. This has brought increased 
humanitarian aid from governments and NGOs to the region.313 To a lesser, but not 
insubstantial degree, Boko Haram has caused an increase in non-military aid to Nigeria. 
If Boko Haram were defeated, much of this foreign military and humanitarian aid would 
rapidly dry-up. This increases the incentive to the government to allow Boko Haram to 
persist. 
3. Relative Economic Benefits of Conflict 
It is certain that parts of the government and some individuals have economically 
benefitted from the ongoing conflict with Boko Haram. In spite of this, it is important to 
keep a perspective of scale in mind. Nigeria pumps 2.5 million barrels per day, bringing 
hundreds of billions of dollars into the treasury every year.314 The government has a 
massive amount of revenue available, rendering even millions of dollars in foreign aid 
less significant, but not irrelevant. Audits of the state oil sector revealed that between 
2002 and 2012 more than $130 billion went missing.315 Annually, an estimated 500,000 
barrels of oil are illegally siphoned out of pipelines throughout the delta.316 Corruption 
by the military leadership from a growing military budget pales in comparison.  
Corrupt military officers would have easily found the means to steal money 
elsewhere. However, this does not negate the significance of the budgetary increases and 
the additional prominence this conflict has brought to the military. Boko Haram is 
responsible for government money being allocated to allow the Nigerian military to be 
great once again. A prematurely defeated Boko Haram would have threatened continued 
spending at this level. The economic benefits of the conflict have contributed to 
prolonging Boko Haram’s existence. Overall, this hypothesis partially explains why an 
oil-rich Nigeria has allowed the insurgency to persist for seven years. The rest of the 
explanation can be found among the political benefits of ongoing conflict. 
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E. POLITICAL BENEFITS OF CONTINUED CONFLICT HYPOTHESIS 
Thus, far, this chapter has examined the strong insurgency hypothesis, the under-
resourced state hypothesis, and the state economic benefits hypothesis to explain a 
persistent insurgency. This section presents and analyzes the evidence supporting a 
political motivation for Boko Haram’s persistence. With the evidence and analysis 
currently available, this hypothesis, coupled with the economic hypothesis, explain why 
Boko Haram has managed to persist as long as it has.  
The government has intentionally allowed the insurgency to persist because of the 
political benefits it brought. The political risks of allowing it to persist were less than the 
political risks involved in combatting it. To support this hypothesis, this section begins by 
examining ways in which President Jonathan derived political benefit from Boko 
Haram’s existence. Then it demonstrates the change in approach immediately prior to the 
2015 election, indicating the politicization of previous decisions. In the coming years, as 
more facts come to light and as Boko Haram is defeated (assuming the current pressure 
on the insurgency continues), additional evidence may further confirm this hypothesis; 
however, the evidence currently available supports the idea that the Nigerian government 
derived more political benefit from Boko Haram’s persistence than it would have from 
defeating it sooner. 
1. Boko Haram as Political Scapegoat  
As previously discussed, Boko Haram was used as economic justification for 
budgetary increases and to solicit foreign aid. The ongoing conflict with Boko Haram 
was equally useful in presidential campaigns and as a political scapegoat to divert 
attention from other issues. During his 2011 presidential campaign, President Jonathan 
emphasized his leadership in the face of Boko Haram to garner political support. Boko 
Haram-directed threats against Jonathan, coupled with pre-election violence further 
enhanced Jonathan’s anti-terror credibility among the electorate.317 After such action 
aided in his 2011 election, there was little incentive to eliminate this useful enemy prior 
to the 2015 election when similar campaign strategies could be, and were, employed. The 
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military campaign of early 2015 was specifically timed to precede the election, allowing 
Jonathan to further call attention to his leadership in the face of the insurgency.318 
Jonathan consistently leveraged the conflict to advance his political agenda. 
Boko Haram proved equally useful in diverting attention away from politically 
sensitive policies. In a speech in January 2012, President Jonathan directly stated that 
Boko Haram had infiltrated the government.319 Without naming any names, his vague 
references to traitor members of the government alarmed many. The speech succeeded in 
diverting popular attention away from the abolition of fuel subsidies, an otherwise 
politically risky move.320 Boko Haram was useful in diverting public attention and in 
commanding the loyalty of dissenting members of his government who did not want to be 
accused of being Boko Haram sympathizers. 
2. Preserving the Boko Haram Status Quo 
Following Boko Haram’s break-out violence in 2009, President Yar’Adua ordered 
his security apparatus to get the nascent insurgency under control.321 Within a year, the 
president had fallen ill, leaving Vice President Jonathan in charge. With the conflict in 
the north building, securing the party nomination in 2011 was no small feat. Boko Haram 
violence intensified, especially in protest to Jonathan’s candidature—being a southerner. 
Popular sentiment within the PDP favored a northern candidate instead of the acting 
president.322 Jonathan managed to secure the party nomination while Boko Haram 
violence intensified. Ultimately Jonathan won the election with an overwhelming 
majority of votes in the southern states, but less than a third in the northern states.323  
This electoral victory taught Jonathan two politically useful facts. First, he could 
secure electoral victory with minimal northern support. To President Jonathan, although 
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the conflict may have affected his popularity in the north, his political machine was 
successful garnering the support necessary to win despite the ongoing conflict and 
insecurity. The conflict may have even deterred voter turn-out, which may also have 
contributed to his success. Second, low levels of public outcry over violence in the north 
were not going to disrupt his chance at reelection. Jonathan was under no obligation to 
fulfill any campaign promises to bring an end to Boko Haram. He proved he could be 
elected while doing the minimum to contain the violence, using the group for the 
economic and political benefits previously outlined. When elected, and during most of his 
presidency, Jonathan consequently felt no obligation to put forth the necessary effort to 
end the insurgency and allowed it to persist. 
Similarly, this experience encouraged Jonathan to preserve the status quo. He 
proved he could be elected in spite of northern opposition and Boko Haram violence. 
Significant military action against an insurgency that did not harm him politically would 
be an unnecessary risk. He could potentially lose favor with his military by sending them 
into large-scale battle. He could lose favor with the electorate if the military campaign 
went poorly. Instead Jonathan adopted the most prudent measure and ordered a minimum 
of military action to partially check the insurgency without risking the force necessary to 
bring it to an end. The status quo was preserved. Nigeria was fully economically and 
militarily capable of acting to end the insurgency sooner. It was the political decision by 
the Jonathan administration that permitted Boko Haram to endure. 
3. Conflict as Politics 
Since Boko Haram began its violent attacks on police stations in the mid-2000s to 
the 2015 presidential election, Nigeria’s leaders have used the conflict as a political tool. 
President Jonathan used the conflict for his political gain and acted to preserve the status 
quo. He neglected the conflict and failed to deal with it in a decisive manner, while 
deriving political benefit from its persistence. He felt little pressure to resolve an ongoing 
conflict that was taking place in what he viewed as a less politically significant region 
and that did not pose a threat to the capital or his primary constituency. Risking military 
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action in the north would have been politically irresponsible and carry more risks than 
benefits.  
President Jonathan made a political decision to not combat Boko Haram until the 
waning months of his presidency. This inaction allowed Boko Haram to persist and grow 
to the point that it took and held territory and killed thousands. Only when the status quo 
changed and he was no longer politically benefitting from the conflict did Jonathan 
authorize decisive action. The effectiveness of the 2015 military campaign demonstrated 
that Nigeria had the ability to defeat Boko Haram all along but it had not used it. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has closely examined Nigeria and the 12-year conflict with Boko 
Haram and sought to explain its persistence. Considering Nigeria’s size—geographically, 
but also with respect to its military, economy, population, and natural resource 
endowment—the country had the capability to directly confront and defeat Boko Haram. 
To explain this phenomenon, the chapter has tested four hypotheses to determine the 
likely cause. Although relatively strong in the north, Boko Haram has never been 
sufficiently strong to pose a threat to the central government. Similarly, Nigeria has 
sufficient resources to deal with such a regional threat. The reason for the insurgency’s 
persistence can be found in Nigeria’s intentional political and economic decisions. 
The benefits of a war economy served to enrich elites within the government. The 
conflict has served to significantly grow the military budget, creating incentive for the 
military hierarchy to prolong the conflict as long as possible. The conflict has also 
presented significant opportunity for certain corrupt individuals to handsomely profit. 
Furthermore, the conflict has facilitated substantial inflows of foreign assistance. 
Although, this funding pales in comparison to Nigeria’s oil revenue, it has proven highly 
significant to the return of the Nigerian military to prominence in the government. The 
economic benefits of the conflict have disincentivized the military from taking decisive 
action to eliminate Boko Haram. 
The conflict was also a political tool government leaders employed to gain, 
consolidate, and manipulate power. The irresolute actions of Nigeria’s president during 
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the height of the insurgency indicate that more action could have been taken to stop Boko 
Haram much sooner. Instead, a southern president appears to have neglected the northern 
region to preserve his electoral advantage as he perceived it. Ultimately the political 
atmosphere changed forcing a change in tactics that demonstrated the politicization of 
Boko Haram’s persistence. 
In all four hypotheses, the most significant evidence to refute or support was 
Nigeria’s successful and resolute six-week campaign to reestablish security in much of 
the north. While Boko Haram is not yet defeated, this highly significant event 
demonstrated the weakness of Boko Haram, and the strength of the Nigerian state. It 
further demonstrated that the military was fully capable of countering Boko Haram when 
ordered to. Finally, it highlighted the years during which the Nigerian government could 
have dealt with Boko Haram, yet did not. It was only when an incumbent’s reelection bid 
was threatened that the order was given to put down the insurgency.  
A critique of this conclusion may suggest two significant facts that could detract 
from the previous analysis. First, it might be suggested that Nigeria employed a sizeable 
force of mercenaries in its six-week push against Boko Haram and that these forces, and 
not the Nigerian troops, were more responsible for Boko Haram’s roll back.324 However, 
Nigeria could have employed such troops several years sooner had it desired to. The price 
of oil was over $100 per barrel for several years before the 2015 campaign; resources 
were available had the government decided to use them. The second critique is along the 
same lines; namely that Nigeria may have required several years of consistently high 
military budgets to compensate for a decade of neglect under the Obasanjo 
administration.325 This might be true. However, the combined multi-national and 
mercenary forces did drive out Boko Haram in a mere six weeks. This indicates that 
Boko Haram was much weaker than suspected. A weaker government force may have 
taken more time, but would still likely have defeated Boko Haram. Either way, a more 
thorough analysis of Nigeria’s military strength from 2008–2014 would likely strengthen 
these conclusions. 
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The campaign against Boko Haram remains ongoing under the leadership of 
President Buhari. But during the first year of his presidency, it appears that the military 
and police are maintaining pressure on the insurgency and degrading its ability to 
operate.326 Certainly as more time goes by, additional evidence will emerge, further 
illuminating the analysis of Nigeria’s actions against Boko Haram. Until then, the 
preponderance of the evidence indicates that Nigeria’s political and military leaders 
allowed Boko Haram to persist for economic and political reasons. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
At the outset, this research sought to explain why otherwise strong African 
nations might allow an insurgency to persist within their borders. On the surface, such 
action would be irrational for a government seeking to consolidate rule and extend 
governance, along a Weberian definition of statehood. Despite this seeming irrationality, 
an underlying logic exists in an African context to allow such conflict to continue if it 
remains isolated from the center of power and if it can be leveraged to political or 
economic gain. Using the cases of Uganda and Nigeria as the focus of study, this thesis 
has demonstrated that such a phenomenon is prevalent in African internal conflicts. A 
careful analysis of these cases might help highlight similar practice in other instances. 
Thurs far, these two case studies present strikingly similar examples of a sitting 
government allowing an insurgency to persist for political and economic reasons. Being 
the more historical of the two cases, the case against Uganda is more explicit. Over time, 
more evidence has surfaced directly linking governmental decisions to political and 
economic justifications for the conflict to continue. In Nigeria, the evidence of corruption 
during the previous administration is already becoming public record; President Buhari 
has taken a strong position in prosecuting culpable individuals. If President Buhari is 
successful in vanquishing or substantially degrading Boko Haram in the coming years, 
more evidence will likely emerge allowing further research into this area.  
In both case studies, the evidence strongly indicates that the sitting governments 
permitted an insurgency to persist for economic and political reasons. Each of these 
categories presented the government with the opportunity to enhance its power while 
exerting a minimum of effort to combat the insurgency. By simply permitting the 
insurgency’s continued existence, the government benefitted. 
With the substantial but limited amount of U.S. foreign and military aid available 
to African nations, it behooves policy makers to make sound decisions in supporting 
regimes dedicated to ending conflicts, not perpetuating them. To that end, this chapter 
highlights some of the dynamics at play in each case study and demonstrates the ways 
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such dynamics may inform on the decisions of policy makers. Such dynamics may 
highlight areas of concern in future conflict, demonstrating other cases where a 
government may not be fully committed to defeating an insurgency within its borders. 
A. ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF CONTINUED CONFLICT 
Both case studies demonstrate insurgencies that were prolonged to the continued 
economic benefit of the central government and to individuals. In both cases, 
insurgencies brought international attention to the plight of the government. This 
facilitated flows of foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, military support, and budgetary 
aid. Of course Uganda and Nigeria were not the only African recipients of foreign aid, so 
it is safe to assume that these countries would have received some aid even without 
ongoing internal conflicts. Nevertheless, policy makers should strongly consider the 
impact that such aid will have on the intensity and duration of an internal conflict. If 
some of the money is tied to an ongoing conflict or to combatting an insurgency, that 
money might indirectly contribute to its persistence. 
In like manner, the elite and military officials fiscally benefitted from the ongoing 
conflict. In both Nigeria and Uganda the military budget was vastly inflated because of 
the ongoing conflict. In the case of Nigeria, a decade of neglect left the military a shell of 
its former self. The Boko Haram conflict brought money and prestige to the previously 
neglected force. They had every reason to expect that the government would roll back 
this budget increase alongside Boko Haram’s defeat. Uganda’s military was similarly in a 
state of degradation at the time of the LRA’s emergence, although more attributable to 
nearly a decade of conflict rather than intentional neglect. At a time when the Ugandan 
economy was reforming, the conflict with the LRA justified increased military spending 
that would likely have been otherwise spent on other post-conflict reconstruction 
measures. In both cases, the military shared a motivation to prolong the conflict to justify 
continued military spending. 
While the military establishments in both countries benefitted from the respective 
conflicts, military officers also found unique ways to maximize profit from ongoing 
conflict in their respective countries. These trends are almost certainly more difficult to 
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track or uncover while the conflict is ongoing. Individual profiteering might be predicted, 
however, in countries where corruption is prevalent. Ongoing conflict generally does not 
decrease corruption, especially among the military officers most concerned with it. When 
assessing motivations for conflict in other countries, researchers should consider the state 
of the military prior to conflict and the impact the conflict has on the military budget. 
This consideration might help predict cases where the military is acting to prolong the 
conflict. 
The effects of a war-time economy are well documented and profiteering from 
conflict is inevitable. Nevertheless it is important for policy makers to consider the nature 
of insurgent conflict in African countries and what economic motivations they have to 
continue the conflict or bring it to an end. These considerations should affect the scale 
and manner in which the U.S. government renders assistance. Generally such economic 
assessments will be closely tied to political analysis of such conflicts; and these case 
studies demonstrate that often economic and political conditions for continued conflict 
complement one another. 
B. POLITICAL BENEFITS OF CONTINUED CONFLICT 
These case studies similarly demonstrate numerous ways in which African 
governments derive political gain from ongoing insurgent conflict. Naturally this 
discourages leaders from concluding politically beneficial insurgencies. Nigeria and 
Uganda have both demonstrated situations where sitting governments derived political 
gain from an insurgency that did not directly threaten the center of power. Both case 
studies had substantial overlap in the manner in which the insurgency politically 
benefitted the center. 
Regional and ethnic marginalization played a significant role in both case studies; 
and interestingly, both involved northern insurgent groups terrorizing a marginalized 
northern people. The dynamics between affected ethnic groups is also significant in both 
cases. The central government in both Nigeria and Uganda maintained a somewhat 
adversarial relationship with the ethnic group that gave birth to the respective 
insurgencies. Also, both the LRA and Boko Haram turned against their own people. In 
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this manner, the insurgencies were helping the central government in repressing a hostile 
regional or ethnic group. These dynamics clearly matter when trying to unravel the 
complexities of insurgent conflict. And when an irrelevant or adversarial ethnic group is 
most directly affected by an insurgent group, the conflict will likely persist much longer 
than if the center or a politically connected group is targeted. 
These case studies similarly highlight the manner in which a leader can gain 
political capital due to an ongoing conflict. In Uganda, the conflict allowed the president 
to grant additional resources to the military, ensuring their continued support and loyalty. 
President Jonathan, in Nigeria, likely expected similar military support after increasing its 
budget and prominence among government institutions. The conflict also permitted each 
government to deploy thousands of federal troops to the affected areas, further 
suppressing restless populations. These leaders also saw increased support among their 
core constituencies for maintaining a fight against adversarial regions or ethnic groups. 
Military deployments served this political purpose as well. 
As democratic elections in both countries neared, the leader was cast as the only 
individual strong enough to continue to fight the nefarious northerners. In Uganda, 
opposition candidates were even cast as sympathetic to the insurgency. Both Jonathan 
and Museveni used the conflict to gain favorable votes, and suppress the ability of 
opponents to vote against them. Both were elected or reelected while insurgencies were 
raging. Both similarly saw benefit in preserving the status-quo through the following 
election. President Jonathan blatantly attempted to gain votes by launching the first 
substantial military operation against Boko Haram on the eve of the election. If beneficial 
in one election, it would likely prove helpful during the next cycle, discouraging 
politically risky security campaigns to degrade or destroy the insurgency. In this manner, 
the insurgency is a political partner—as long as it does not threaten the center, it should 
help the incumbent at reelection time.  
These political dynamics may be more difficult to identify in ongoing conflicts. 
Observers and policy makers should consider the relations between ethnic groups, 
regional interactions, party constituencies, and the impact of the conflict on political 
campaigns. This information may help identify other instances where an internal conflict 
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might be exploited for political gain. Providing substantial foreign aid or support in such 
circumstances would further prolong the conflict, increasing the suffering of those 
populations most affected by the insurgent operations. 
C. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
Overall, these two case studies demonstrate the role that an insurgency can play in 
the complex dynamics of power in African states. As emerging democracies, an 
insurgency is seen less as a challenge to the state and its constitution (as it would in a 
liberal democracy), and more as a challenge to personal rule. How a government 
responds to that challenge depends greatly on the dynamics at play. The goal of a liberal 
democracy would be to eliminate the threat. In an emerging democracy in Africa, the 
insurgency is viewed as another aspect of a complex web of intersecting power dynamics 
that needs to be balanced to ensure continued individual or party rule. The insurgency 
may be allowed to persist where it is politically and economically beneficial to the center 
for it to do so. Policy makers must understand that the goal of an African partner nation 
might not be to directly confront and eliminate the threat. Analysts need to take an 
extremely careful and nuanced view of the ethnic dynamics, history, resources, 
economics, political situation, etc., when advising on policy objectives. Policy makers 
need to carefully weigh such analysis when choosing to support a government in its 
internal conflict, and understand that the objectives of the partner nation might drastically 
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